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ABSTRACT: 
 
Micro-processes of integration – i.e. how agents develop identities, properties and decision-
making behaviours preferred by a particular institution – have been a topic of significant 
scholarly debate.  Most previous work builds on one underlying theoretical framework and 
thereby excludes (potentially important) elements lying outside it. My thesis attempts to 
contribute to the ongoing debate by developing a more holistic understanding of these 
processes, based on the dialectics of structure and agency and thereby positions actors’ 
decision-making behaviour on a continuum between ‘structural idiocy’ and ‘structural 
entrepreneurism’. Theoretically, my model draws on institutionalist approaches of rational 
choice (RCI) – modified by Goffman’s theory of dramaturgic action – and organisation 
theory, combined through a synthetic, ‘both/and’ logic of application.  Analytically, it is 
operationalised as a mutually influencing relationship of social mechanisms of strategic 
optimising and role-playing, and calibrated by a number scope conditions – i.e. organisational 
design features, domestic variables, and exposure. By employing Seconded National Experts 
(SNEs) in the European Commission as its test case, the empirical illustration of modelled 
decision-making behaviour provides limited support for its predictions.  That is, both strategic 
optimising and role-playing define SNEs’ behaviour, and their relative strength appears to 
vary along the pre-defined dimensions. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
(MICRO) INTEGRATION AS DIALECTIC OF STRUCTURE AND AGENCY  
 
Introduction 
That (international) institutions matter is, by now, widely acknowledged by integrationalist 
and Europeanist scholars.1 Why they matter – why an actor (be it a individual or a state) 
should behave in accordance with favoured norms of a particular institution – varies 
according to the theoretical anchoring of integrationalist scholars, and covers a wide range of 
reasons such as shaping of strategies, preferences, interests or identities (Haas, 1958; Young, 
1989; Millward, 1992; Moravcsik, 1993; March and Olsen, 1998; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet, 
1998; Risse et al., 1999; Checkel, 2001a; Christiansen et al., 2001; for a comprehensive 
overview, see Wiener and Diez, 2004). 
 
Correspondingly, how institutions matter in these (micro) processes of integration – i.e. how 
an actor develops such identities, properties and decision-making behaviours as are preferred 
by a particular institution – is also subject of debate. The various explanations offered in the 
existing literature are, once again, linked strongly to the theoretical background of scholars 
proposing them (ibid). The most fruitful explanations, however, come from neo-
institutionalist theories that argue the decisive saliency of various institutional structures 
(regulative, normative or cultural-cognitive; Scott, 2001).2 For example, organisation theory 
sees institutions as normative structures, whose defining characteristics have (mostly) 
constraining (Haas, 1990; Hooghe, 2001a; Egeberg, 2003; Trondal, 2001, 2003) effects on 
actors’ identities, conception of roles and behaviour.3 Institutions supply behavioural 
“relevance criteria” – embedded in organisational role expectations (Egeberg, 2004: 4) – that 
guide actors (via (a degree of) “automaticity” and habituation; Checkel, 2005: 812) towards 
enactment of ‘appropriate’ behaviour. No internalisation of norms is envisaged in this 
                                                 
1  Throughout my thesis, the guiding definition of institutions (both formal and informal) is that coined by 
Selznick in 1957, who describes them as “organizational arrangements infused with values beyond their 
instrumental utility” (Olsen, 2005: 4). 
2  An overview of neo-institutional approaches is provided in Martin and Simmons (1998) and Aspinwall and 
Schneider (2000, 2001).  On the socialising role of institutions, see special issues of Comparative Political 
Studies (2003) and International Organization (2005). 
3  Roles may be perceived as normative expectations guiding behaviour (Scott, 2001), while decision-making 
may be seen as processes where premises are supplied and chosen (Simon, 1997a). I specify that the 
‘behaviour’ referred to throughout my thesis is organisational, not personal (the latter is assumed to be put 
aside when an individual becomes a member of an organisation; cf. Egeberg, 2004).  
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approach. Socio-constructivist institutionalists, on the other hand, argue that institutions are 
defined by their cultural-cognitive structures (Wendt, 1999) that have constitutive effects on 
actors’ identity, properties and behaviour (Risse et al., 1999; Checkel, 2001a, 2003b; Gheciu, 
2005). Specifically, institutions are perceived to lead actors to internalise norms, rules and 
values, and towards making ‘appropriate’ decisions after a conscious thought because “it is 
the right thing to do, even though I didn’t used to think so” (Checkel, 2005: 812). Finally, 
rational choice scholars see the role of institutions as regulative, and thus strictly constraining. 
Within such structures – if an adoption of norms does occur – it results purely as a result of 
agents’ strategic and optimising behaviour (Hall and Taylor, 1996; Martin and Simmons, 
1998; Shepsle, 2005; Schimmelfennig, 2004, 2005; Sedelmeier, 2006).  
 
It is clear that such accounts stand at opposing ends of the ‘structure-agency’ argument (for a 
concise overview, see Wendt, 1999; Fearon and Wendt, 2002). Nonetheless, such placing 
does not, I argue, automatically support the ‘either/or’ analytical dichotomy, commonly4 
practiced by modern integrationalist theories. For even though the former two approaches 
view actor’s identities, properties and decision-making behaviour as resulting from socialising 
influence of institutional structures (thus following (a degree)5 of ‘logic of appropriateness’ 
(March and Olsen, 2006b), and the latter – by identifying agency as a key element – defines 
actor’s behaviour as strategic and consequential (where structures, at best, play only an 
intervening role), these three structures should not be understood as mutually exclusive. 
Rather, they – and consequently, I propose, also their effects upon actors – should be 
understood as forming a continuum, leading “from the conscious to the unconscious, from the 
legally enforced to the taken for granted” (Hoffman in Scott, 2001:51; see also March and 
Olsen, 2006a).   
 
Inasmuch as the current empirical studies almost simultaneously provide evidence for, on the 
one hand, the strength of socialising effects, and on the other, their unevenness and weakness 
                                                 
4  Notable recent exception is James Fearon and Alexander Wendt, who argue in “Rationalism v. 
Constructivism: A Skeptical View” that “ the most interesting research is likely to be work that ignores zero-sum 
interpretations of their relations and instead directly engages questions that cut cross the rationalist/constructivist 
boundary as it is commonly understood” (2002:52; italics added). 
5   Within the sociological institutionalist rendition, the influence of normative institutional elements does not 
trigger off invocation of ‘pure’ logic of appropriateness. Expounding the principle of ‘bounded rationality’, this 
perspective explains that the shift from logic of consequentiality to logic of appropriateness has only begun, 
since it involves only the process of appropriation of relevant roles, rather than the process of reflective 
internalisation of relevant norms, which is triggered off by ‘pure’ logic of appropriateness.  Nonetheless, due to 
the fact that the process does involve a degree of noncalculative behavioural adaptation, I choose to regard it as 
operating also with (some) logic of appropriateness (Checkel, 2005).  
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(Zürn and Checkel, 2005), I argue that such divergence, in fact, points at shortcomings of 
analytical dichotomising. To that effect, the main contribution of my thesis concerns the 
development (end empirical illustration) of a holistic account that incorporates both effects, 
thus models behavioural adoption as a continual, rather than dichotomic, process.    
 
 
 
1.1.Thesis’ Research Question  
As introduced above, my thesis’ central aim is to elaborate upon the possibility that neither 
the socialising qualities of ‘institutional effects’, nor the ‘optimising actor’ argument alone 
can explain how institutions lead actors to form identities, adopt roles and make ‘appropriate’ 
decisions. Instead, and guided by recent suggestions concerning the role of strategic 
calculation and social influence within the dynamics of socialisation (Hooghe, 2001b; 
Schimmelfennig, 2002, 2003; Checkel, 2003b, 2005; Johnston, 2005; Zürn and Checkel, 
2005), my thesis attempts to both theoretically answer, and empirically illustrate, the 
following question: 
 
Q: Can actors’ identities, properties and decision-making behaviour – rather than being 
singularly shaped either by socialising effects of an institution’s structures, or through 
actors’ strategic evaluation of costs and benefits from appropriate behaviour – be better 
characterised as issuing from their mutually influencing relationship? 
 
Such formulation is, however, very general and implicitly subsumes socialising effects of 
both normative and cultural-cognitive institutional structures. While this arguably is “close to 
the common-sense meaning of socialisation” (Zürn and Checkel, 2005: 1045), it nonetheless 
presents considerable operational challenges (ibid, 2005: 1072). Consequently, since my 
thesis intends not only to theorise, but also empirically illustrate, a more holistic view of 
(micro) processes of integration, I will in the remainder focus on effects of normative 
structures only. These lead actors towards an adoption of new role conceptions and decision-
making behaviour (or Checkel’s Type I internalisation) (March and Olsen, 2006a; Simon, 
1997a; Egeberg, 2003, 2004).  The effects of agency I operationalise as a strategic evaluation 
of immaterial costs and benefits, directly accruable from the enactment of ‘appropriate’ roles 
and behaviour. 
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Finally, while there is an (assumed) causal chain linking behavioural roles (or strategic 
optimising) to actual decision-making behaviour, only behaviour is inherently observable. As 
a consequence, to empirically illustrate my theoretical claims, I select actors’ manifested 
decision-making behaviour as my dependent variable.  In the operationalisation of the model, 
behaviour will be measured via SNEs’ perceptions of their loyalty and their actual work 
identity.6 Consequently, I finalise my research question thus:  
 
RQ: Can actors’ decision-making behaviour in an institution – rather than being 
singularly shaped either by socialising effects of organisational ‘role expectations’, or 
through actors’ strategic evaluation of costs and benefits from appropriate behaviour 
– be better characterised as issuing from their dialecticism?  
 
 
 
1.2.Proposed Argumentation 
As understood from my thesis’s research question, I view the dialecticism of normative 
structures and strategic agency as a guiding rationale for behaviour adoption. 
 
Analytically, my model is defined by its dynamic character, and thus fundamentally differs 
from static renditions of both the ‘socialising powers of institutions’ argument (which 
inherently views agents as passive beings or “structural idiots”, Checkel, 2003b: 11), and the 
‘structure entrepreneurship’ argument (which views any development of properties, 
dispositions and decision-making behaviour as driven solely by instrumental rationality of 
utility-maximising individuals; Shepsle, 2005; Schimmelfennig, 2005). Further, by applying 
‘both/and’ logic of analysis, my model attempts to enrich the existing theoretical apparatus 
and supplant the currently dominant ‘either/or’ logic and its ontological dichotomy.    
 
Theoretically, I extrapolate my research question from two sources: i) from the understanding 
of modern sociologists and psychologists that all social action is defined by individuals’ 
innate self-consciousness vis-à-vis structures within which they operate. Consequently, 
structurally framed explanations of how an individual develops properties, dispositions, sense 
of belonging and loyalty, as well as what shapes his/her decision-making behaviour, are 
                                                 
6   Work identity is constituted as a composite of SNEs’ preferences, work mandate and work ethics. 
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inadequate; the influence of “self-socialization” also needs to be accounted for (Zinnecker in 
Zürn and Checkel, 2005: 1051; see also Sears, 1993; Taber, 2003). ii) From the contention 
that “there is little reason to think that human behaviour towards norms is either always self-
interested or always a function of perceived legitimacy. (…) What is to stop someone from 
saying that he obeyed a norm for both reasons?” (Fearon and Wendt, 2002: 61-62 original 
italics; see also Jupille et al., 2003; Checkel, 2005).  
 
Importantly: should one concede the reasonableness of both claims, (s)he ought to also accept 
that modelling actors’ decision-making behaviour as resulting from an inherently dialectic 
process (of structure’s socialising effects and actors’ self-socialisation), offers a more 
accurate understanding than the current uni-directional accounts. Hence, and incorporating 
Hoffman’s tenet of institutional continua (cf. supra), I will argue that any decision-making 
behaviour must be seen as a continuum, rather than dichotomy, between ‘structural idiocy’ 
and ‘structural entrepreneurism’. Clearly, this line of argument directly implies I (must) 
construct my theoretical model with the conceptual tools of multiple theories (as single 
theories focus on either structure or agency and thus do not allow modelling the continuum 
between them; cf. supra). However, and critically, such combination posits selection of 
theories that are ‘bridgeable’, i.e. exhibiting sufficient degree of commensurability. Such 
bridge-building is facilitated when one views “theories pragmatically as analytical tools rather 
than meta-theoretical positions and empirical description of the world” (Jupille et al., 2003: 
15).  Following this recommendation, I will rely on two neo-institutionalist approaches 
(namely, rational choice and organisation theory), as these, in my view, contain sufficient 
overlapping, even complementing, analytical tools to warrant their integration in my model 
(ibid; see also Fearon and Wendt, 2002). Analytically, they will be combined through 
‘both/and’ logic of application (Jupille et al., 2003a; Checkel, 2005; Johnston, 2005; Zürn and 
Checkel, 2005) 
 
Finally, I empirically illustrate my model using the case of the European Commission 
(Commission) and the body of its temporary officials – national experts, seconded to the 
European Union (EU) on temporary contracts (SNEs in Commission’s phraseology). SNEs 
have, surprisingly, received little attention in studies of international (re)socialisation and 
Europeanisation (for exceptions, see Trondal, 2006a, 2007 and Trondal et al., 2007) and are, I 
argue, ideally suited to demonstrate the theoretical model’s hypothesised dialecticism.  For 
one, the EU is an environment defined by a high density of institutionalisation, which is a pre-
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requisite for any socialising effects of structures to occur (Egeberg, 2004; Checkel, 2005; 
Johnston, 2005; Schimmelfennig, 2005; Hooghe, 2005; Trondal et al., 2005).  Second, the 
Commission has the “authority to select and groom its employees with minimal national 
interference [and thus elicits] strong reasons to expect (…) international socialisation to be 
effective” (Hooghe, 2005: 862).  Third, while the Commission thereby presents the ‘most-
likely-case’ (Eckstein, 1975; King et al., 1994; Yin, 2003) of structural effects, the inherent 
structural tensions of the secondment system – coupled with its temporal limitations – not 
only make SNEs ‘least-likely-cases’ (ibid) of EU-socialisation, but also, and crucial for 
assessing my thesis’ hypothesised strategic calculation, allow SNEs to act strategically by 
calculating the costs and benefits of adopting Commission’s roles of behaviour.7
 
 
 
1.3. Thesis’ Aims 
By attempting to answer the proposed research question (see page 4), my thesis has three 
ambitions:  
i) To conceptualise a dynamic model of behaviour adoption; 
ii) To propose a synthetic, ‘both/and’ institutionalist approach, combining rational 
choice and organisation theory propositions; 
iii) To offer an empirical illustration of the theory, methodologically designed as 
limited ‘incorporation’. 
 
First Aim: Thesis conceptualises SNEs’ adoption of Commission-specific behaviour as 
resulting from the interplay between two different rationales of behavioural adaptation: semi-
reflective socialisation (i.e. defined by a degree of ‘automaticity’) (Checkel, 2005: 810) into 
Commission’s behavioural role expectations, and strategic evaluation of costs and benefits of 
that adoption.  Following the literature, these are operationalised via causal mechanisms.8  
                                                 
7   Interestingly, recent SNE-socialisation studies – such as Trondal et al. (2007) – hint at the temporarity of 
some (in this case supranational) (re)socialising outcomes.  This appears to confirm hypotheses derived 
from a (cognitive) organisational approach regarding the instantaneity of behavioural adaptation within 
current organisational structures (Trondal, 1999).  However, it can also imply a degree of optimising of 
‘logic of appropriateness’ guiding SNEs’ adoption of Commission’s normatively defined roles of decision-
making behaviour (Johnston, 2005), as promoted by my theoretical model.   
8  Mechanisms are “recurrent processes linking specified conditions and a specific outcome” (Mayntz in 
Checkel, 2005: 808). For this thesis, the term refers to “the intermediate processes along which international 
institutions may lead actors towards accepting norms, rules and modes of behaviour of a given community” 
(Zürn and Checkel, 2005: 1049). 
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The reliance on mechanisms not only allows for formulation of more finely grained 
hypotheses and measurement of their observable implications (Elster, 1989; Hedström and 
Sweberg, 1998; Martin and Simmons, 1998; Jupille et al., 2003), but also has an added 
benefit of such accounts being generally “quite compatible with different social theories of 
action” (Jupille et al., 2003: 19): highly relevant to my model since it incorporates two 
different actions: instrumental and bounded-rational/’practical’.9  Pertaining the selection of 
causal mechanisms, it should be noted that – while numerous causal mechanisms can be 
identified – I apply the rule of parsimony and select two principal10 causal mechanisms as my 
independent variables: those of social influence and role-playing. Additionally, I calibrate my 
model by factoring in following scope conditions of (i) organisational design features, (ii) 
domestic variables, and (iii) exposure.  Each of these, I argue, is implicitly conducive to both 
social mechanisms, and thus relevant both for theorising, and empirical illustration, of their 
hypothesised dialecticism. In other words, while the model proposes that both social 
mechanisms are at work all the time, the degree to which each matters will vary depending on 
scope conditions (thus defining placement along the continuum between both mechanisms). 
 
Second Aim: Thesis proposes a synthetic, ‘both/and’ institutionalist approach to the analysis of 
dialectically driven processes of Type I-socialisation, based on combination of rational choice 
and organisation theory. However, since socialisation can take place only in social (Johnston, 
2001) and never in material environments, the classic rationalist tenet of ‘cost-benefit 
calculation’ is within my model re-defined to apply to social, non-material benefits and 
constraints.11 To this end, I modify ‘classic’ rational choice institutionalism by incorporating 
Erving Goffman’s social theory, whose core tenet of dialecticism between “manipulation and 
morality” (Branaman, 1997: xlvi) theorises that informal social values and norms, including 
moral concerns, produce strong effects on actor strategies (Schimmelfennig, 2003). In short, 
my model’s theoretical synthesis is thus represented by a combination of i) Goffman’s view 
on actors as “performers engaged in manipulative presentations of self, constrained by the 
                                                 
9  For the purpose of my theoretical argument, ‘practical’/bounded rational action differs from instrumental 
rationality since it, by definition, inherently assumes (a degree of) appropriateness in its logic (Checkel, 
2005; for definition of ‘practical’ action, see DiMaggio and Powell, 1991).   
10   The notion of causal mechanisms must include causal chains with more than one link connecting the trigger 
with the effect. Hence, for a more complete account of processes of socialisation, it is necessary to look both 
at primary and secondary mechanisms (Zürn and Checkel, 2005). However, such complex operationalisation 
is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
11  This modification can be justified by referring to recent arguments that calculations of subjectively 
perceived social influence can, under certain conditions, lead to actors’ norm-consistent behaviour (Checkel, 
2005; Schimmelfennig, 2005). 
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script and the consistency of their roles” (Schimmelfennig, 2002: 417), and ii) organisation 
theory accounts of institutions’ normative structures providing simplifying shortcuts, buffers 
and cues for making ‘appropriate’ decisions (Egeberg, 2003, 2004; Trondal, 2006a, 2007).  
 
Third Aim: Thesis offers an empirical illustration of the theoretical model based on 
Commission’s temporary staff.  This analysis is methodologically designed as a (limited) two-
step ‘incorporation’ and employs data drawn from primary and secondary sources of both 
current and previous Commission SNEs. The primary data consist of author’s in-depth 
interviews of current Norwegian, Swedish, Dutch, British and Polish SNEs (N=13), 
conducted in March/April 2007, while the secondary sources are a combination of data from 
thirteen in-depth interviews of Norwegian and Swedish SNEs, conducted in 2004-2005, and 
papers (co)authored by Prof. Jarle Trondal (Trondal, 2006a, 2007; Trondal et al., 2007).  
 
Importantly: through these three aims, my thesis aspires to explore new conceptual tools, 
designed to offer a more multi-faceted definition and more testable operationalisation of 
processes shaping decision-making behaviour. In doing so, it directly addresses the problem 
of “underspecified theoretical apparatus” within the field of socialisation and (European) 
integration (Zürn and Checkel, 2005: 1072) and at the same time answers calls for theoretical 
‘bridge-building’ (Fearon and Wendt, 2001; Jupille et al., 2003; Checkel, 2005; Johnston, 
2005; Zürn and Checkel, 2005).  
 
 
 
1.4.Thesis’ Structure 
To conclude this introductory chapter, I present a concise overview of my thesis’ five-fold 
structure.  
 
After this first, introductory chapter, where I delineate the fundamental arguments, research 
question and aims of my thesis, the second chapter is dedicated to the theoretical 
underpinnings and construction, operationalisation and visual rendition of my thesis’ 
proposed model. This second chapter first (Section 2.1) discusses reasons for – and ways to – 
invoke the proposed theoretical synthesis.  It also presents the theories selected for this 
double-step synthesis: rational choice, modified (i.e. first step) by Goffman’s social theory 
(Section 2.1.1) and (second step) organization theory (Section 2.1.2), as well as the method of 
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their synthesis (Section 2.1.3). Then, in Section 2.2, I offer a comprehensive account of 
Commission’s structures and behavioural role expectations, together with the concept of 
secondment and SNE recruitment procedures.  This is prerequisite information for the main 
part of this chapter (Section 2.3), dealing with the model’s operationalisation and formulation 
of hypotheses. Due to the formulational difficulties connected to the operationalisation and 
formation of a dialectic model, I also offer its visual rendition (Section 2.4).  
 
The following, third chapter addresses and defends the methodological (or study design) 
features of my thesis’ research question, both from the perspective of the theoretical 
framework and the empirical illustration of the model. Specifically, Section 3.1 examines the 
problem of commensurability with respect to the selected theories and discusses the subject of 
verification versus falsification (which is crucial for the derivation of the appropriate 
empirical strategy). Then, Section 3.2 describes the overall empirical strategy, its external 
and internal validity, reviews the process of sample selection (noting on the potential problem 
of self-selection), and finally regards the crucial point of causality (versus correlation). 
 
The fourth chapter contains the illustrating empirical analysis. The opening part (Section 4.1) 
puts forth empirical evidence of: i) SNEs’ strategic calculations of (costs and benefits of) their 
secondment; ii) SNEs’ behaviour activated by Commission’s organisational structures. The 
identified presence of both elements suggests – as argued – that uni-theoretical explanations 
are insufficient. This finding, in turn, provides a vital starting point for the ensuing illustration 
of the six synthesized hypotheses.  In Section 4.2, I then bring forward empirical findings 
suggesting that the relative strength of behavioural role expectations and strategic calculations 
of social influence (upon SNE decision-making behaviour) indeed differs under certain 
conditions (namely, organisational recency, education, chronological primacy and 
noviceness). This provides some support for the view that the development of roles, identities 
and modes of behaviour is best understood as interplay between strategic optimising and role-
playing. 
 
In the fifth and final chapter of my thesis I summarise its overall findings and touch upon 
some normative issues connected to supranational socialisation: notions of identities, 
questions of legitimacy and the relative roles and powers of national and supranational 
legislative bodies. I also discuss potential avenues of future research. Finally, should any 
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caveats arise during the theoretical discussion and/or analysis, these will also be addressed in 
this chapter.  
 
 10
CHAPTER TWO 
 
SPECIFYING THEORETICAL APPARATUS 
 
Introduction 
My thesis questions traditional accounts of actors’ integration based on either the effects of 
strategic action or structurally driven socialisation. Such ‘either/or’ accounts are now widely 
understood to provide an “underspecified theoretical apparatus” (Zürn and Checkel, 2005: 
1072; see also Checkel, 2001a, 2005; Jupille et al., 2003; Johnston, 2005).  Instead, my thesis 
proposes a more holistic – ‘both/and’ – account, which combines both effects in a dialectic 
relationship. While it thereby (arguably) attempts to come closer to the “common-sense 
understanding” of how actors behave in social contexts (Zürn and Checkel, 2005: 1045), it 
also faces major challenges. Indeed, how does one operationalise behaviour that is moulded 
by a mutually influencing relationship of structural socialisation and strategic action? What 
are the necessary conceptual tools to design such model? Consequently, in order to 
substantiate the proposed model, I need firstly to modify and/or develop conceptual tools that 
allow me to operationalise it; which, in turn, will generate testable hypotheses to empirically 
illustrate it. 
 
The present chapter first considers the general issue of theoretical (in)commensurability, 
presentation of the chosen ‘bridgeable’ theories, defence of their selection and the method of 
their synthesis (Section 2.1).  Then, I turn to a comprehensive account of necessary 
background information of identified cases (Section 2.2), crucial for operationalisation of 
analytical tools and formulation of guiding (synthesised) hypotheses (Section 2.3). The 
concluding Section 2.4 presents the model’s visual rendition. 
 
 
 
2.1. Towards theoretical synthesis 
To combine strategic action with (Type I) socialisation and suggest this combination as a 
rationale for processes that shape actors’ decision-making behaviour faces a considerable 
challenge.  The reason is that both elements of this combination are steeped in different views 
of reality, are understood to be driven by different rationality, and have different levels of 
analysis. More specifically, strategic action – driven by a consequentialist logic of optimising 
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individuals within a material environment – is the rationale for realist theories, while 
socialisation is one of the key concepts of constructivist theories and describes a process of 
mutual interaction between individual and institutional structures through which (s)he 
becomes ‘constituted’ (or gains an identity).  Nonetheless, while the ontological and 
epistemological differences of the respective (meta)theories are undoubtedly insurmountable, 
many social scientists have began to point out that “only in the rarest cases is there but one 
plausible account to explain an outcome” (Jupille et al., 2003: 17-18). This led scholars to 
look for ways of incorporating (potentially important) elements lying outside one’s (chosen) 
mono-theoretical framework.  
 
The best starting point, it is argued, to overcome theoretical incommensurability12 is to search 
for such terms (e.g., dependent variables) in each theory as are mutually translatable. While 
finding such mutually translatable terms is, per definition, impossible at the level of abstract 
meta-theories, “finding ways to understand each other” is more real in a problem-driven, 
empirically-oriented perspective characterising the middle-range social scientific approaches 
(Jupille et al., 2003: 17-18; see also Checkel and Moravcsik, 2001; Zürn and Checkel, 2005; 
Trondal et al., 2007). This, I argue, singles out neo-institutionalist approaches as the most 
feasible alternative for theoretical synthesis and, ultimately, for advancing a more nuanced 
(and holistic) view of reality. One can think of four reasons why this is the case:  
i) They subscribe to the notion that institutions matter (i.e. while offering different 
explanations of ‘what’ they are and ‘how’ they matter, institutional structures are 
commonly identified as one of (possible many) independent/intervening variables), 
ii) They have behaviour as one of dependent variables, 
iii) They are ‘process oriented’ and 
iv) They rely on causal mechanisms and scope conditions to formulate testable 
hypotheses. 
 
Modelling SNEs’ decision-making behaviour (within the Commission) as resulting from a 
mutually influencing relationship of agential strategic optimising and structural Type I-
                                                 
12  The commensurability issue pertains to the fact that “theories are different language systems with limited 
mutual translatability, [since] words (or scientific terms) have different referent (observables) in different 
theories, [which means] that comprehension is not simply a matter of fitting two different words to the same 
underlying phenomenon. Each theory does its own work at the data level – determining what are the 
relevant data – and if observations we aim to use to adjudicate among theories are themselves infected by 
the theory, this exercise is doomed to fail” (Jupille et al., 2003: 17, based on Kuhn’s The Structure of 
Scientific Revolution).  
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socialisation, I specifically rely on Rational Choice Institutionalism (RCI) and organisation 
theory approaches. However, the strategic considerations in my model pertain to the 
attainment of social influence, which – per definition – is a social, not material incentive in a 
social, not material, environment.13  Hence, as RCI is inherently ill equipped to operationalise 
such social influences (North, 1994), I modify RCI by incorporation of Erving Goffman’s 
social theory.  This, I argue, not only operationalises social incentives in a social environment, 
but also allows me to ‘bridge’ (modified) RCI with organisational theory, whose tenets 
specify ‘appropriate’ action in a socio-institutional environment. 
 
2.1.1. Rational Choice Institutionalism and Erving Goffman’s Social Theory 
As one of the several approaches assembled under the umbrella of Rational Choice Theory 
(Pollack, 2006), RCI shares this theory’s core assumptions regarding: 
i) Methodological individualism (individual as the basic unit of social analysis),  
ii) Utility-maximising (individuals’ action is rational in character since it issues from 
calculations of expected utility and follows ‘logic of consequentiality’) (March and 
Olsen, 1989), and 
iii) The recognition of various institutional or strategic constraints on individual choice 
(individuals strategically evaluate the alternative courses of action within the 
constraints of their environment).14 
 
Crucially for my argumentation, both assumptions of utility maximising and structural 
constraints offer a ‘space for theoretical dialogue’, which is essential for the creation of 
conceptual tools to operationalise my model (Jupille et al., 2003). Firstly, while an individual 
is always viewed as driven by calculations of costs and benefits (thus acting consequentially 
and strategically), the concept of ‘utility’ need not be materialist; utility can also be of 
immaterial nature (ibid, see also Ferejohn, 1991; Johnston, 2001; Fearon and Wendt, 2002). 
Consequently, RCI allows for conceptualisation of ‘immaterial’ optimising (although it is ill 
                                                 
13  Social influence could, naturally, be enumerated in material gains; however, that is not the concern of this 
thesis. 
14  At the same time, it differs from this so-called ‘second-order’ theory (Wendt, 1999) – understood in the 
sense of theory concerned with ontological and epistemological matters of social reality – by being 
‘substantive’ and ‘domain specific’ in character. It identifies particular social systems (such as the EU, or, 
in the case of my thesis, the Commission) and its constitutive actors (Commission’s organisational 
structures and the SNEs) as objects of its study, makes specific assumptions about them and formulates 
testable hypotheses articulating explicit causal or interpretative claims about their relationship. It thereby 
allows the generation of empirical evidence for its validation (Pollack, 2006: 3-5). This is not the case for 
second-order Rational Choice theory, which can be neither supported nor falsified by empirical evidence 
(Pollack, 2006). 
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equipped to offer adequate generic operationalisation of such activity; North, 1994). Secondly: 
while individual strategic action in RCI is understood to be exogenously constrained by the 
surrounding environment (i.e. structures), these constraints can be of physical (material) as 
well as social or institutional character (Granovetter, 1985). Vital with regard to my model, 
RCI thus does – as in the case of optimising – allow for the possibility that normative (and/or 
cognitive-cultural) structures influence individual action (ibid). However, as with agential 
optimising, RCI is again ill equipped to adequately operationalise the cultural and social 
constraints of strategic action (North, 1994). 
 
This discussion illustrates that, a priori, there are no serious assumptive problems on the part 
of RCI theory to model behaviour as resulting from mutually interacting effects of strategic 
action and institutionally defined behavioural role expectations.  However, it also makes clear 
that practical difficulties regarding operationalisation of non-material optimising within a 
non-material environment need to be addressed. To that end, I (partially) incorporate Erving 
Goffman’s (1959, 1982) theory of dramaturgic action into RCI. Put succinctly, Goffman’s 
theory ascertains that life in a social environment constrains agents by the script and the 
consistency requirements of the roles (or “framework of appearances”) that they must 
maintain (Schimmelfennig, 2002: 417-422). While quite possibly believing the rightness of 
those roles’ fundamental rules, actors do not internalise them nor are motivated by them; 
instead, they see them as “resources for strategies” which are to be “used, not followed” for 
their own advantage (Edgerton, 1985: 12-14). As a result, when an individual is in a (given) 
social situation, “he will have many motives for trying to control the impression [others] have 
of him (…) [and] he can influence this (…) by engaging in impression management” 
(Goffman, 1959, in Schimmelfennig, 2002: 423).  
 
Goffman’s theory – through its dialecticism of “manipulation and morality” (Branaman, 
1997; xlvi) – thus conceptualises agents as ‘performers’ engaged in “manipulative 
presentations of self within a social environment” (Schimmelfennig, 2002: 417).  In other 
words, underlying norms of behavioural roles can be used strategically to achieve, preserve, 
and even increase actors’ ‘standing’ and/or influence (Schimmelfennig, 2002, 2003; italics 
added). It should be noted that, unlike in organisation theory – where organisational role 
expectations trigger certain behaviour through habituation and (a degree of) automaticity 
(Checkel, 2005: 812) – actors’ behaviour in this case is strategically aligned to those frames 
(or structurally defined roles). 
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I argue that Goffman’s theory of social action fulfils the necessary requirements for (partial) 
subsumation into RCI: that is, it conceptualises institutions as constraints and incentives, and 
social actors as strategically calculating agents. Also, it offers the necessary conceptualisation 
of soft causal mechanisms to operationalise strategic action as immaterial optimising.  As 
such, it motivates my model’s conceptualisation of strategic action as ‘optimising of logic of 
appropriateness’ (Johnston, 2005), and operationalises it as optimising of social influence, 
gained from ‘behaving appropriately’. Moreover, strategic action now becomes adequately 
‘understandable’ to the (organisational) concept of behavioural role expectations with which it 
is modelled to mutually interact (cf. infra).  Specifically, by interpreting an organisational 
environment as a social situation for its actors, and accepting that the ‘logic of 
appropriateness’ defines it, ‘making appropriate work decisions’ is, therefore, a close proxy 
for “impression management” (cf. Goffman, 1959), and the “frameworks” are those 
appropriate role expectations as are encoded within each organisation’s formal structure.  
 
2.1.2. Organisation theory 
In sharp contrast to RCI, organisation theory – along with institutionalist approaches also 
derived from cognitive/social psychology (Checkel, 2005) – adheres to the following tenets: 
i) Adopts an interpretivist approach to how individuals and groups make sense of the 
social world of which they are part.  
ii) Views (social) actors as engaged in ‘practical’ action (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1991), which – while open to making choices in a systematic and purposeful 
manner – is driven by a ‘logic of appropriateness’ that is institutionally defined 
(March and Olsen, 1996).15 
iii) Adheres to a holistic conceptualisation (or “complex duality”; Hay and Wincott, 
1998: 956) of actor-environment interaction. Actors are seen to alter, and respond 
to, their environment by taking calculated action, but they do so according to their 
beliefs and practices which have been formed by these very same environments 
(i.e. they are perceived both as homo politicus as much as homo economicus). 
 
In its aim to understand how different organisational contexts contribute to the enactment of 
different identities, role conceptions and modes of behaviour, organisation theory perceives 
organisational members as individuals made up of a multitude of identities, roles and 
                                                 
15  Acting ‘appropriately’ consists of conforming to the expectations of others, following established routines 
and conventions, and adjusting behaviour as a result of learning from previous experiences. 
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possibilities for action (or as ‘multiple selves’; Elster, 1986), and argues that these are 
(de)activated by a particular organisational context (Trondal, 1999). In essence, institutions 
are viewed as normative constructions that shape the understanding, behaviour and 
preferences of agents (Scott, 2001) while agents ‘play a role’ depending on the organisational 
context. Given that agents’ attention is scarce and they cannot deal efficiently and 
appropriately with all available information, one warranty for appropriate decisions-making 
behaviour – i.e. to trigger the ‘right’ role – is then to formally design the organisation 
horizontally and vertically so as to create “organisational borderlines [that act as] buffers to 
attention [and hence] biasing the information exposed to the decision makers” (Trondal, 1999: 
11).16  Consequently, the organisational context is viewed as a complexity-reducing 
mechanism that – formulated as “relevance criteria” (Egeberg, 2004: 4) – decomposes 
complex tasks into sub-tasks, which can be carried out within relatively independent units of 
governance. Moreover, inasmuch as identities, roles and decision-making behaviour are 
thereby seen as (organisational) context-specific, they are understood to be relatively easy to 
mould and re-mould by (re)designing those contexts: i.e. should the organisational context 
change overnight, it is assumed that identities, roles and behaviour change overnight too 
(Egeberg, 1994, 2004; Trondal, 1999). 
 
This discussion implies first of all that to operationalise the ‘role-playing’ mechanisms of my 
model I must examine the basic organisational characteristics of the institution within which 
my agents interact. Clearly, each of the four organisational features specified in theoretical 
work (i.e. organisational structure, organisational demography, organisational locus and 
institutionalisation)17 will have direct relevance to my model. Indeed, not only must the 
                                                 
16   By biasing the information for actors’ action, normative structures are, per definition, never neutral 
(Schattenschneider, 1975: 30).  
17  “Organisational structure” refers to the collection of rules and roles that specify who is expected to do what 
and how; such structures can be horizontally and vertically delineated (Egeberg, 2004). The horizontal 
principle of specialisation, f.e., denotes which questions should be horizontally linked, and which should be 
systematically kept apart (Trondal, 1999; see also Egeberg, 2004). Generally, four fundamental principles 
are distinguished (i.e. purpose (sector), process (function), territory and clientele served; cf. Gulick, 1937) 
and these are understood to promote different identities, roles and decision-making behaviour amongst 
organisational members. Further, the “organisational demography” pertains to the composition of 
organisational population (in terms of age, gender, nationality, education and length of service within the 
organisation). Length of service is often seen as most important (however, for its ‘primacy’ in re-socialising 
processes, it requires consistency of its effects over time; Egeberg, 2004), although proportions of 
organisational populations should also be given due consideration (as actors with similar professional and/or 
territorial characteristics can create ‘enclaves’ which interests may eclipse organisational effects; Egeberg, 
2004). “Organisational locus” denotes the physical location of organisations and can play an important role 
by creating physical boundaries between those decision-making role expectations ‘preferred’ by a particular 
physical environment and those representative of an organisation located elsewhere.  Finally, 
“institutionalisation” denotes the process of ‘growing-up’ through which an organisation acquires a distinct 
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organisational context (i.e. the Commission) within which my selected cases (SNEs) are 
embedded be institutionalised to develop socialising qualities necessary to induce 
appropriation of its preferred behavioural role expectations, it also has to be structured, staffed 
and located in such a way that its ‘preferred’ role expectations will be strong enough to not 
only compete with SNEs’ previous organisational identities, roles and decision-making 
behaviour, but also to withstand their optimising.  
 
Secondly, it transpires from the above examination that organisation theory – especially by 
adhering to the tenet of ‘complex duality’ between structures and actors (cf. supra) – allows 
for conceptualisation of strategic optimising of institutional structures, and therefore concurs 
with RCI.  This entails the feasibility of my proposed (limited) incorporative approach, 
employed to model and validate my thesis’ hypothesised dialecticism of strategic action and 
socialisation. Furthermore, the organisational operationalisation of socialising effects is also 
adequately ‘understandable’ to (modified) RCI’s operationalisation of strategic action to 
justify their synthesis through both/and logic of analysis.   
 
2.1.3. Theoretical model of synthesis 
In the previous two sections, I argue to have established that there are not only fruitful 
“assumptive openings” within both theories to conduct a theoretical dialogue, but also feasible 
operationalizable possibilities for a carefully structured empirical dialogue (Jupille et al., 
2005: 3). To this end, I believe to have shown that: 
i) RCI and Goffman’s social theory of action are sufficiently mutually ‘translatable’ 
to allow for a (limited) incorporation of the latter into the former. 
ii) This allows me to re-conceptualise RCI’s core tenets of strategic rational action 
and material environment in such a way as to render them (and RCI) 
‘understandable’ to the ‘language’ of organisation theory. 
iii) As a result, I can operationalise mutually understandable independent and 
dependent variables, apply the both/and logic of analysis to generate testable 
hypotheses,  
iv) and thus theoretically develop and (empirically) illustrate the hypothesised model 
of dialectically driven (micro) processes of integration.   
 
                                                                                                                                                        
identity, which “infuse(s) [it] with value beyond the technical requirement of the task at hand” (Selznick, 
1957: 17).  This is critical since socialisation can take place only in a densely institutionalised environment. 
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While this two-step synthesis represents not only the most ‘demanding’ theoretical dialogue 
available18 but also the most ‘hegemonic’ in result19, I maintain, however, that such 
theoretical dialogue is the only one capable of formulating hypotheses based on mutually 
influencing relationships.  
 
 
 
2.2. Structures of European Commission and the Concept of Secondment 
Prior to detailing the resulting model and its guiding hypotheses (Section 2.3), I firstly need to 
provide a comprehensive account of necessary background information of my cases, as this 
will be crucial for operationalisation of analytical tools and formulation of hypotheses. 
Consequently, this section elaborates upon the structures of European Commission and the 
concept of secondment,  
 
2.2.1. Structures of European Commission 
The European Commission (Commission) is the executive body of the world’s most 
encompassing supranational regime (i.e. the European Union; EU). It holds agenda-setting 
powers and has a vocation to identify and defend the European interest over and above – and, 
if need be, against – particular member-state interests. Furthermore, its system of governance 
not only encompasses a complex web of organisations networking with member-state 
administrations – earning it a description of ‘multi-organisation’ – but, arguably, also mirrors 
the idiosyncrasies of the entire system of EU-governance:  multi-level, multi-lingual, multi-
national and supranational. 
 
The Commission is formally organised by horizontal specialisation along three principles – 
i.e. purpose, process and territory (cf. Gulick, 1937).  These are linked in a dual system of 
primary and secondary specialisations, where purpose and process are the primary principles, 
supplemented (indirectly) by the secondary principle of territory.  
                                                 
18  Others – in order of increasing difficulty – are competitive testing, additive theory and sequencing (Jupille et 
al., 2003).  
19  It is based on (partial) absorption of the ‘weaker’ theory by the ‘stronger’. Unfortunately, though, it is – 
again – the ontological and epistemological anchoring of the scholar doing the subsumation that decides 
which theory is to be subsumed. Giving these two caveats, there is a clear possibility that the new, derived, 
theory is weaker in its explanatory readiness than either of the ‘original’ theories (Jupille et al., 2003: 21), 
and ‘contaminated’ by scholar’s subjectivity. Thus the internal validity of the study might be far from ideal.  
However, to control for such possibilities is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
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i) Following the primary principle of purpose, the Commission is pillarised 
sectorally into twenty-five Directorate Generals (DG), encompassing typical 
governmental portfolios as agriculture, trade, economy and finance, health and 
education, etc. Internally, each DG is designed vertically in a strict hierarchy 
running from a politically appointed Commissioner, through heads of divisions 
and units down to desk officers. This particular specialisation activates patterns of 
co-operation (and conflict) among Commission DGs along, rather than across, 
sectoral (i.e. departmental) cleavages (Egeberg, 2006). Thereby it tends to invoke 
departmental logic in decision-making dynamics, and triggers off enactment of 
specific portfolio (sector), DG and unit identities, roles and decision-making 
behaviour amongst its employees (Trondal et al., 2007). Organisational loyalties 
tend to also lie with units, departments and portfolios, rather than with the 
Commission as a whole (as is typical for such specialisation).  
ii) The Commission’s second horizontal principle of organisation is that of process – 
such as administration, legal service, personnel service, etc. While built as 
freestanding DGs, they oversee the internal functioning of the entire Commission 
and thereby work across sectoral cleavages. For all purposes, this principle – by 
encouraging horizontal integration of functional departments – “disintegrates” the 
principle of purpose (Trondal et al., 2007: 12) and activates both departmental and 
epistemic logics of decision-making behaviour.  This leads to activation not omly 
of departmental, but also epistemic (i.e. independent expert) identities, roles and 
behaviour. Nonetheless, this principle can – due to its ‘bridging quality’ – at times 
evoke loyalty also towards the Commission as a whole. 
iii) Finally, the principle of territory is also discernable in the Commission’s formal 
organisation. However, due to its indirectness (i.e. through recruitment of de facto 
national officials, both on temporary basis – such as SNEs – and permanent basis – 
such as Administrator, Cabinets and Commissioners), this principle is secondary to 
those of purpose and process.  Nonetheless, it can – arguably – open the 
departmental-epistemic axis of behavioural logics to the influences of territorially 
defined (i.e. national and supranational) logics. This can send “ambivalent signals 
to Commission’s officials” (Hooghe, 1997: 105) about which behaviour is 
‘appropriate’; especially when affiliation to the Commission is ambiguous (i.e. as 
for SNEs, who have simultaneous affiliation both to the Commission and their 
domestic administration; cf. infra). Moreover, apart from blurring the primary-
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secondary structure dichotomy of organisational embeddedness, such multi-logic 
of behaviour can (potentially) deactivate the “automaticity” trigger (Checkel, 
2005: 810) of appropriate roles, thus leaving the official with no (or insufficient 
and/or unclear) buffers against information overload, which can impair his/her 
overall performance. 
 
2.2.2. The concept of Secondment 
Since the original intention of the first president Jean Monnet was to rely on a seconded, 
flexible staff of top experts, the High Authority was already in 1952 staffed by numerous 
SNEs from member-state governments (Duchêne, 1994; Trondal et al., 2007). While always a 
clear minority among Commission’s staff, their number has steadily increased over the years 
and at present constitutes approximately ten percent of the eleven thousand plus workforce of 
Commission’s technocrats (Statistical Bulletin of Commission Staff, 01/2007). 
 
SNEs are recruited to the Commission through a rather opaque process, described as a 
“submarine approach” (Stevens and Stevens, 2001: 87) or an ‘entry through the back door’ 
(Trondal et al., 2007). It is the Director, or the Head of unit, of a DG who announces 
vacancies and, ultimately, also determines the concrete job description (EEA, 2002: 4). While 
the majority of vacancies are made public by informing the Permanent Representations of EU 
member-states in Brussels – which passes them on to the relevant national administrations – 
some are also advertised on the Internet and are open to direct personal initiatives. Interested 
national officials most often send their applications directly to the recruiting unit, which 
selects, interviews, and chooses the most suitable candidate (Statskontoret, 2001: 17-34). 
Upon gaining a secondment contract, SNEs are for its duration released from their domestic 
duties to work exclusively for the Commission. However, they remain that home 
administration’s permanent (and fully paid) employees and are expected to return there 
(Commission Decision C (2004) 557). 
 
The concept of secondment is based on a short-term contract (two years, with a possible 
extension of two more years). Its rules specify that (Commission Decision C (2004) 557): 
i) SNEs are to exclusively follow the interest of the Commission and not to accept 
any tasks or duties from their respective home governments 
ii) SNEs neither have the authority to represent the Commission externally nor to 
enter into any commitment on behalf of the Commission 
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iii) While the Commission covers some of their expenses, their salaries are in their 
entirety paid by their home government. 
 
Clearly, the concept of secondment is riddled with ambiguities of multiple institutional 
affiliations and makes it difficult to unambiguously ascertain the hierarchy of SNEs’ 
organisational memberships (Flora, 1999: 3). The ambiguity leads to a multi-layering of 
“relevance criteria” (Egeberg, 2004: 4) for ‘appropriate’ conduct, which leaves SNEs 
susceptible to four (partially) competing behavioural roles: departmental, epistemic, 
intergovernmental and supranational. Such ‘multi-hattedness’ (Trondal, 2006a) could, 
potentially, also weaken the “automaticity” logic of role enactment (Checkel, 2005), which, in 
turn, might open the effects of Commission’s structures to the influence of strategic 
optimising by SNEs.  
 
 
 
2.3. Dialectic Model of (micro) integration 
2.3.1. Operationalisation  
The issue of what, and how, shapes actors’ decision-making behaviour has been consistently 
ascribed either to effects of strategic choice or socialisation. My thesis, on the other hand, 
incorporates both effects in a dialectic relationship. To operationalise this model, I apply 
specific social mechanisms and scope conditions under which their dialecticism will unfold 
(for a definition of such “mechanisms”, see footnote 8). I rely on mechanisms as such models 
are generally devised to work “at an analytical level below that of a more encompassing 
theory” (Johnston in Checkel, 2005: 808), which is the only way to avoid the 
incommensurability issue (cf. supra). Moreover, since they are typically formulated as 
hypotheses, they offer more detailed explanations, which – in turn – increase theory’s 
credibility.  
 
More specifically, I model dialecticism of structure and agency by relying on formulation of 
hypotheses that invoke social mechanisms characteristic of selected theories of action: i) 
social influence (theory of rational, i.e. consequential, action) (Trondal, 1999) and ii) role-
playing (theory of bounded-rational/’practical’ action) (ibid).   
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i) Mechanism of strategic action  
I choose to define the agential mechanism of strategic calculation as (an adequate amount of) 
social influence, attained by adopting (Commission) specific decision-making behaviour. This 
mechanism does not envisage any internalisation of (Commission’s) norms and values for 
adoption of ‘appropriate’ behaviour. Instead, agents adopt such behaviour on the strength of 
their strategic calculation of social influence, identified by them as directly attainable from 
adopting such behaviour (Johnston, 2005). Generally, social influence is operationalised as 
various social rewards (e.g., respect, status, career advancement, etc.) and punishments (e.g., 
shaming and/or shunning ‘on the job’, lack of promotion, etc.) (Johnston, 2001; 
Schimmelfennig, 2002). Specifically for the purpose of my model, I measure social influence 
as SNEs’ career advancement possibilities and gaining professional (Commission-wide) 
contact network (both social rewards) and interruption or loss of SNEs’ domestic career 
advancement and the reduction or loss of domestic professional contacts (both social 
punishments).  
 
       ii)          Mechanisms of structural socialisation  
To account for effects of structural socialisation, I choose the mechanism of role-playing, 
which, according to organisation theory, leads actors to enact organisationally specific 
‘appropriate’ roles and ‘appropriate’ behaviour. In view of the fact that the Commission is 
formally organised along the principles of purpose, process and territory, each with 
corresponding “relevance criteria” for role expectations (Egeberg, 2004: 4), SNEs are guided 
to act departmentally (as a representative of the unit and/or DG they are working for), 
epistemically (as an independent expert), nationally (his/her government’s representative) and 
supranationally (representative of the Commission as a whole). Consequently, the 
operationalisation of role-playing (social) mechanism within my model includes four 
(ideational) behavioural roles: epistemic, sectoral, national and supranational.  
 
Note that, in keeping with Elster’s notion of the individual as ‘multiple self’, the actual 
behaviour invoked by these roles need not be constrained to one role.  Indeed, by viewing 
individuals as capable of evoking several, partially contending roles either sequentially (Cyert 
and March, 1992), or/and simultaneously (March 1994), it explicitly adheres to the notion of 
their ‘multi-hattedness’ (Trondal, 2006a). 
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2.3.2. Formulation of Principal Hypothesis 
As previously explained, rather than modelling SNEs’ decision-making behaviour as shaped 
either by: 
i) Strategic evaluation of social influence gained from ‘behaving appropriately’ 
according to Commission’s norms and values (i.e. Rational Choice Hypothesis 
RCH: Adopting Commission-specific decision-making behaviour increases SNEs’ 
chances of furthering their post-secondment career and gaining useful 
Commission-wide contact networks), or  
 
ii) Socialising effects of organisationally-borne behavioural role expectations 
(Organisational Hypothesis OH: During their secondment, SNEs’ decision-making 
behaviour is shaped by Commission’s behavioural role expectations, designed to 
provide simplifying shortcuts, cues and buffers necessary for making ‘appropriate’ 
decisions),  
 
my model sees it as ensuing from a mutually influencing relationship of both above-
mentioned social mechanisms. Hence – and by invocation of ‘both/and’ logic of analysis – I 
formulate thesis’ main (synthesised) hypothesis (SH):  
 
SH:   During their secondment to the Commission, SNEs’ decision-making behaviour is 
fostered by dialecticism of Commission’s organisationally-borne role expectations and 
SNEs’ strategic calculation of social influence. 
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For the purpose of its conceptual clarity, and to alleviate its unavoidable formulational 
complexity, I offer its visual rendition in Figure 2a.20
 
Fig.  2a: SNEs’ Decision-making Behaviour: Dialectic of Commission’s Behavioural 
Role Expectations and SNEs’ Calculation of Social Influence 
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2.3.3. Scope Conditions – Calibration 
To further calibrate my thesis’ model, it is necessary to consider those scope conditions under 
which it can be argued that effects of Commission’s behavioural role expectations (upon 
SNEs’ behaviour) are, on the one hand, so strong as to eclipse SNEs’ strategic calculation of 
social influence (accruable from adopting such behaviour), but, on the other hand, so porous 
as to admit that optimising. In other words, although both social mechanisms (i.e. role-playing 
and strategic optimising) are argued to be at work all the time, the degree to which each 
matters will vary depending on certain scope conditions.  These thus define the placement 
along the continuum between both mechanisms (in this sense, as mentioned, my model 
reflects Hoffman’s tenet of institutional continua; cf. supra). Guided by the relevant 
organisational literature (Gulick, 1937; Johnson 1987; Cyert and March, 1992; March, 1994; 
Egeberg, 1999a, 2006; Egeberg and Trondal, 1997; Trondal, 2006a, b), and as already 
                                                 
20  Since my model conceptualises decision-making behaviour as resulting from dialecticism of both agential 
and structural mechanisms, it is, per definition, synthetic in its character. Hence, formulation of the above 
SH hypothesis is incompatible with the ceteris-paribus rule (or ‘all else equal’) that guides the traditional 
construction of hypotheses. 
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introduced in the First Aim in the Section 1.4. (p. 7), I calibrate my dialectic model to include 
the following scope conditions:  
 
(1) Organisational design features (effects of compatibility and recency of organisational 
structures, i.e. primary and secondary embeddedness during the secondment) 
(2) Domestic variables (effects of education and chronological primacy of organisational 
structures, i.e. between primary and secondary affiliation in time)  
(3) Current Exposure (effects of intensity and noviceness).  
 
I justify this selection by arguing that the element of (bounded) rationality, which delineates 
the dynamics of action in all of these, accounts equally for influence of both strategic and 
role-playing social mechanisms. 
 
(1.) Organisational design features 
The organisation theory perspective specifies that rules and roles of who does what, when and 
how within an organisation are given by the particular structural design of that organisation 
(March, 1994; Egeberg, 2001; see also footnote 17). Since different organisations can have 
different structures and hence also different behavioural role expectations, the structural 
variable is of paramount importance when analysing how (and why) SNEs during their 
secondment to the Commission adapt their behaviour from home- to Commission-relevant.  
Importantly, organisation theory distinguishes between two main types of structures, primary 
and secondary, which can be ranked according to their respective importance for actors’ 
behavioural adaptation. Specifically, it is believed that the primary organisational structures – 
i.e. those of the main employer – are much more “demanding” (e.g., people are expected to 
spend most of their working time there) than the secondary ones (these usually engage people 
only part-time) (Egeberg, 2004: 6). Consequently, the impact of primary structures upon 
identities, roles and behaviour is considered much more profound than of those that are 
secondary.  However, during SNEs’ secondment to the Commission, ‘primary’ and 
‘secondary’ structures become blurred, since they are full-time employees of both structures 
simultaneously.21 As a result, the socialising influence of Commission’ behavioural role 
expectations can, at best, be curtailed and, at worst, eclipsed by SNEs’ strategic evaluation of 
their ‘usefulness’ to attain social influence.  
                                                 
21    Commission: full-time measured in work time versus home administration: full time in pay. 
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(1.i.) Based on SNEs’ affiliational ambiguity, I choose to calibrate the guiding hypothesis for 
the compatibility of Commission and domestic administrative structures.22 Indeed, to detect 
any structure-driven (re)socialisation, the literature expounds that structures must be 
adequately incompatible (hence have different behavioural role expectations) (Egeberg, 2001, 
2004). It follows then that the more compatible both structures are, the less likely there will be 
any re-socialisation (Egeberg, 2004; Johnston, 2005; Zürn and Checkel, 2005). Applied to the 
present setting, this entails that the compatibility23 of structures across Commission and 
SNEs’ domestic administrations reduces the likelihood of Commission re-socialisation24 
(Egeberg, 2004; Johnston, 2005; Zürn and Checkel, 2005). In that case, strategic optimising is 
likely to be the more decisive effect (relative to role-playing) in explaining any observed 
behavioural adaptation in SNEs.  Reversely, SNE behavioural adaptation is likely to derive 
more from role-playing (relative to strategic optimising) when incompatibility between 
organisational structures of Commission and SNEs’ domestic affiliation is greater.  
Consequently, I hypothesise that:    
SH1: Increased incompatibility of Commission and SNEs’ domestic organisational structures 
strengthens effects of Commission’s behavioural role expectations upon SNE decision-making 
behaviour relative to strategic calculations of social influence, derived from that behaviour – 
and vice versa. 
 
(1.ii) The principle of organisational recency holds that embeddedness into current structures 
defines agents’ identities, roles and decision-making behaviour and overrides any 
(pre)socialisation from previous embeddedness.  This derives from organisation theory, which 
maintains that identities, roles and decision-making behaviour are relatively easy to mould 
and re-mould (Egeberg, 1994, 2004; Trondal, 1999). This thus dictates that the current 
primary structures re-socialise employees and de facto generate replacement of previous roles 
of behaviour. However, the effect of recency pre-supposes an unambiguous primary and 
secondary affiliation. Due to SNEs’ affiliational ambiguity, there is no such clear temporal 
                                                 
22  Naturally, controlling for compatibility of primary and secondary structures becomes relevant only if both of 
these structures are designed along the same principle. Only if primary and secondary organisational 
structures are designed to fulfil the same function, their (in)compatibility can be analysed.   
23     Note however, that this comparison of structures is not based on a factual account of their (in)compatibility. 
        Rather, it is based on SNEs’ subjective perceptions, thus making it a subjective, not an objective measure. 
24  One can also argue that such structural compatibility can be deliberately relied upon when designing the 
Commission, in order to sustain and underpin previously appropriated behavioural roles. This could be, for 
example, an interesting argument when explaining the saliency of SNEs’ behaviour as independent experts 
or representatives of the given department/portfolio, rather than the Commission as a whole (see Chapter 
Four).  
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separation.  As a result, the influence of current socialising structures might be curtailed, 
and/or contaminated by previous ones and can, ultimately, also be conductive to SNEs’ 
strategic evaluation of social influence (derived from adopting such behaviour). Nonetheless, 
it remains possible to measure the influence of ‘recency’ for SNE re-socialisation by 
investigating the degree of ‘autonomy’ from the domestic administration during SNEs 
secondment to the Commission.  Indeed, the more autonomous (or separated) SNEs are from 
their home administration, the stronger Commission’s role expectations can be expected to 
shape SNEs’ decision-making behaviour (relative to the influence of strategic optimising of 
social influence). When, on the other hand, SNEs retain close ties to their home 
administration, any behavioural adaptation to the Commission’s ‘appropriate’ behaviour is 
more likely to derive from strategic optimising (with a weaker influence of role-playing).  
Hence, I hypothesise that: 
SH2:  Greater autonomy of SNEs from their domestic organisation strengthens effects of 
Commission’s behavioural role expectations upon their decision-making behaviour relative to 
strategic calculations of social influence, derived from that behaviour – and vice versa.   
 
(2.) Domestic variables: 
A crucial element in socialisation research generally – and, I argue, of particular importance 
within my study of SNEs’ (re)socialisation within the Commission – is the extent and type of 
domestic pre-socialisation. Socialisation theories argue that the pace, process and outcome of 
socialisation inside the current environment is affected by socialisation within the previous 
environment (Hooghe, 2005; Johnston, 2005; Lewis, 2005). Hence, since SNEs enter the 
Commission “pre-packed” with “images and attitudes acquired over the years” in domestic 
educational and professional settings (Egeberg, 2004: 7), any (re)socialisation effectuated 
during their secondment might well be impacted by them. Consequently, I calibrate my model 
to control for the effects of education and chronological organisational primacy, and argue 
that both influence the strength of Commission’s socialising powers to such extent as to open 
them to SNEs’ calculation of social influence, derived from behaving ‘appropriately’.  
 
(2.i) To account for the effects of education, I argue that people’s first and most intense 
period of socialisation occurs in institutions of education (Johnston, 2005; Zürn and Checkel, 
2005). Hence, education can indicate whether – and how – particular SNEs will be led during 
their secondment into adopting Commission-preferred behaviour. For example, the nature and 
institution(s) of SNEs’ education give them access to professional “enclaves” within the 
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Commission (Egeberg, 2004: 8).  This might not only facilitate the adoption of Commission-
specific behaviour, but can also assist SNEs in strategic creation of a valuable contact-
network. In other words, education can supply SNEs with initial socialising and strategic 
‘short cuts’, instrumental either for SNEs’ socialisation into, or their strategic evaluation of, 
Commission’s behavioural role expectations. Crucial, however, is whether or not the 
education ‘moulds’ SNEs in line with European – or Commission – identities, roles and 
loyalties, or national ones.  Hence, in accounting for the effects of SNEs’ education, I 
hypothesise that:  
SH3: More ‘Europeanised’ education of SNEs strengthens effects of Commission’s 
behavioural role expectations upon their decision-making behaviour relative to strategic 
calculations of social influence, derived from that behaviour – and vice versa for more 
‘national’ education of SNEs. 
 
(2.ii) Additionally, I argue that the temporal, or chronological, aspect of affiliational primacy 
plays an important role. For the current primary structures (i.e. second in chronological time) 
to extend such re-socialising powers as to eclipse pre-socialisation effects of previous primary 
structures (i.e. first in chronological time), requires consistency of its effects over time.  The 
length of embeddedness within both structures is thus crucial (Egeberg, 2004). Specifically, 
the longer the actor’s full and continuous affiliation to previous (primary) structures, the 
‘stickier’ those behavioural role expectations – and the more difficult will it be to ‘dislodge’ 
them and affect re-socialisation. Ultimately, any present process of shaping actor’s decision-
making behaviour will then be – at best – open to, or – at worst – driven by, strategic 
calculation of social influence derived from it.   
 
Applying this argument to the setting of my thesis, it can be argued that only if SNEs’ prior 
primary (i.e. domestic) affiliation was less than four consecutive years25 it could be expected 
that SNEs’ ‘appropriate’ behaviour will be primarily shaped by structure-driven 
(re)socialisation.  The effect of strategic calculation, though present, will be less salient.  
Otherwise (i.e. longer embeddedness in previous primary structures), SNEs’ ‘appropriate’ 
behaviour is likely to be driven more strongly by their optimising of ‘logic of appropriateness’ 
(Johnston, 2005).  Consequently, I hypothesise that: 
                                                 
25  Four years is the maximum length of any secondment contract (Commission Decision C (2004) 557). 
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SH4: Longer previous embeddedness of SNEs in their domestic organisation weakens effects 
of Commission’s behavioural role expectations upon their decision-making behaviour relative 
to strategic calculations of social influence, derived from that behaviour – and vice versa. 
 
(3) Current Exposure: 
Last, but not least, I calibrate my model by the influence of current exposure, which is of 
crucial importance for the assessment of current behavioural shifts among socialisees 
(Egeberg et al., 2003; Beyers, 2005; Hooghe, 2005; Lewis, 2005; Trondal, 2006a). There are 
several ‘exposure effects’ that could be applicable for my model: length, intensity, 
noviceness, etc. However, given that length of secondment is restricted by Commission 
regulation (cf. supra), I select intensity and noviceness for the purpose of my model.  These 
two, importantly, are also directly connected to the previous discussions of SNEs’ 
organisational affiliations.  
 
(3.i) While there is a general ‘length versus intensity’ debate amongst scholars, I argue that 
only intensity has relevance in the assessment of current exposure effects on SNEs’ 
socialisation.  The reason, as mentioned, is that the time spent working in the Commission 
(i.e. max. four years) is not long enough for its role expectations to maximise their effects 
upon SNEs’ behaviour and curtail their strategic optimising of them. Hence, it is the intensity 
of interaction with one’s closest colleagues, of immersion into organisational life, and the 
importance of organisation-wide contacts on (and for) individual’s everyday performance that 
is the salient issue within the analysis of structural effects upon SNEs’ decision-making 
behaviour. That is, should SNEs feel isolated, lonely and/or ‘on the side-lines’ while working 
in the Commission, any adoption of Commission-relevant decision-making behaviour will 
more likely be the result of SNEs’ strategic evaluation of, rather than due to, Commission’s 
behavioural role expectations (i.e. role-playing).  On the other hand, when SNEs have intense 
contacts with Commission co-workers, the effect of Commission’s behavioural role 
expectations is likely to gain importance relative to strategic optimising. Consequently, I 
hypothesise that: 
SH5: Less intense contacts of SNEs with Commission co-workers weakens effects of 
Commission’s behavioural role expectations upon their decision-making behaviour relative to 
strategic calculations of social influence, derived from that behaviour – and vice versa. 
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(3.ii) Lastly, the scope condition of noviceness is – as all previous ones – intrinsically 
connected to conditions of structural compatibility and socialisation. Appearing ‘competent’ 
to colleagues and superiors in the unit, DG, Commission is paramount. Being a ‘novice’ – or 
having no “relevance criteria” to draw upon (i.e. being a true ‘tabula rasa’; Inayatullah and 
Blaney, 1996; Trondal, 1999) – can lead organisational members to be particularly responsive 
to effects of ‘the’ behavioural role expectations, and lower their awareness of social influence, 
accruable from such behaviour. Specifically for SNEs, I argue that Commission’s behavioural 
role expectations are most likely to have decisive effects on shaping (while limiting the 
optimising of) behaviour of those SNEs, who are ‘novices’ in the sense that they entered the 
Commission without public administration experience – and thus were not (domestically) 
‘pre-socialised’ in the national government’s structures.26 It is thus expected that upon joining 
the Commission, these SNEs will be – to camouflage their noviceness – more ready to mimic 
permanent officials’ behaviour. Consequently, they will be more susceptible to the effects of 
Commission’s behavioural role expectations. 
 
In relation, note also that Europeanist scholars analysing this exposure effect (e.g., Hooghe, 
2005) observed that it often comes as a combined effect with youth. My empirical data 
include information from SNEs who fit at least one of those characteristics – i.e. either 
coming to the Commission without public administration experience and/or being young (e.g., 
two out of three British SNEs I interviewed were so-called ‘fast-trackers’, and under thirty 
years of age).27  Hence, I hypothesise that: 
SH6: Noviceness of SNEs strengthens effects of Commission’s behavioural role expectations 
upon their decision-making behaviour relative to strategic calculations of social influence, 
derived from that behaviour – and vice versa. 
 
 
 
                                                 
26  Note that, apart from structural noviceness, SNEs could be exposed also to ‘cultural’ noviceness – 
pertaining the meeting of two contending administrative cultures (e.g., differences between ‘French’ and 
‘Northern-European’ bureaucracies) – upon their secondment to the Commission.  
27  ‘Fast-track’–programme has been created by the British civil service to recruit young, talented and highly 
educated individuals into civil service (by passing stringent entrance examinations, not unlike those of EU’s 
Concours).  There they are submitted to a demanding cross-sectoral ‘apprenticeship’, devised to ‘groom’ 
them for fast career advancement into the civil service highest echelons.   
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2.4. Visual Rendition of the Model 
Since the complete model of processes shaping SNEs’ behaviour is fairly complicated, I 
present its visual rendition in Figure 2. 
 
 
FIG. 2: SNEs’ Decision-making Behaviour: Dialectic Model Calibrated by Selected Scope 
Conditions 
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CHAPTER THREE 
  
METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
Introduction 
While Chapter One of my thesis deals with the contextualisation and formulation of my 
thesis’ research question and Chapter Two offers a comprehensive account of theoretical 
apparatus (from the discussion of applied theories to the operationalisation and formulation of 
guiding hypotheses), the present Chapter Three addresses and defends its methodological (or 
study design) features.   
 
This firstly concerns the approach taken in developing the theoretical framework and the 
problem of commensurability with respect to the various theories I bring together (discussed 
in Section 3.1).  This section also includes a discussion on the general subject of verification 
versus falsification, as deriving from the both/and approach taken in the theoretical 
framework and having relevance for my thesis’ empirical analysis. Then, secondly, I turn to 
methodological issues relevant for testing the theoretically derived hypotheses and 
determining their robustness (Section 3.2).  This section first of all deals with the overall 
empirical strategy (i.e. the choice for qualitative rather than quantitative research methods and 
its external and internal validity), subsequently reviews the process of sample selection (i.e. 
the reasons for – and methods of – case selection and the potential problem of self-selection) 
and, finally, discusses the important issue of causality (versus correlation).   
 
 
 
  
3.1. Study Design at Theory-level 
Traditional theoretical models of norm internalisation build on a single underlying framework 
(usually rationalist or socio-constructivist). This ‘uni-theoretical’ approach, per definition, 
excludes (potentially important) elements lying outside the chosen framework, ultimately 
leaving the researcher(s) to work with an “underspecified theoretical apparatus” (Zürn and 
Checkel, 2005: 1072).  As more extensively elaborated in Chapter Two, my thesis’s 
argumentation advances, on the other hand, a multi-faceted understanding of norm 
internalisation processes. This notion relies on combination of two institutionalist approaches 
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(rational choice (RCI) and organisation theory) under analytical application of ‘both/and’ 
logic.   
 
While this multi-theoretical approach directly responds to the calls of institutional scholars for 
bridging the “methodological void” between these schools (Jupille et al., 2003; Checkel, 
2005; Johnson, 2005; Zürn and Checkel, 2005), two crucial methodological issues need to be 
addressed before any bridging may be considered.  First, it requires that theories can be 
fruitfully brought together (i.e. commensurability problem).  Second, it entails determination 
of the “model of theoretical dialogue” (i.e. sequencing, subsumption, competitive testing or 
domain of application; cf. Jupille et al., 2003: 19-24). 
  
With respect to the first point – i.e. commensurability – the divide between RCI and 
organisation theory is certainly real at the level of epistemology and ontology.  Nevertheless, 
if regarded pragmatically as analytical tools, rather than substantive theories, they exhibit 
adequate amount of overlapping and complementarities to warrant their integration (Jupille et 
al., 2003; Checkel, 2003a; Jupille, 2005; Zürn and Checkel, 2005).  Consequently, it ought to 
be possible to circumnavigate their epistemological and ontological divide and test them 
empirically by operationalising the theoretical argument via determination of social 
mechanisms (i.e. identifying basic elements that link different social phenomena together) and 
specifying scope conditions  (or “applicability bounds”, King et al., 1994: 101) for when 
certain social dynamics are more likely to materialize than others.  Such mechanism-driven 
accounts of norm internalisation are specifically devised to work “at an analytical level below 
that of a more encompassing theory” (Johnson in Checkel, 2005: 808).  Moreover, they are, in 
principle, “quite compatible with different social theories of action” (Mayntz in Checkel, 
2005: 808).  Note also that – in line with the common practice of mechanism-based 
approaches – the model is formulated as hypotheses.  This has been argued to offer more 
detailed explanations, which – in turn – increases the theory’s credibility (Johnson in Checkel, 
2005: 808). 
 
However, there exist many possible social mechanisms, distinguishable in four major groups: 
rational choice, cognitive, integrative, and interactive (all of which provide different dynamics 
and ‘outcomes’ as regards the construction of identities, role conceptions and modes of 
acting; Trondal, 1999).  Including (if possible) all of them – while certainly leading to a 
model of internalisation that is very close to its “common-sense understanding” (Zürn and 
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Checkel, 2005: 1045) – would make my theoretical model too complicated and opaque, my 
theory lacking parsimony and rendering empirical validation extremely arduous.  
Consequently, it would be advisable to invoke “Ockham’s razor”-principle28 of theoretical 
parsimony (Moore, 2001) in order to eliminate mechanisms irrelevant for my argumentation. 
Specifically, my theoretical model includes two types of mechanisms: rational and 
cognitive/integrative.29  This choice followed from the fact that they rely on different logics 
(strategic and bounded-rational/appropriate) to trigger them off, and thus address and explain 
different parts of the (hypothesised) dynamics of adoption of ‘appropriate’ behavior. At the 
same time, however, as more extensively discussed in Chapter Two and above, their 
underlying theoretical models (i.e. RCI and organization theory) have sufficient overlap to 
allow for the construction of an integrative model.30    
 
Regarding the second methodological point – i.e. the “model of theoretical dialogue” – I 
execute a limited, two-step31 version of the “incorporative” approach (Jupille et al., 2003: 25), 
based on identification of such group of scope conditions, as is understood to demarcate the 
“applicability bounds” (King et al., 1994: 101) of the new, ‘incorporated’ theory, created to 
explain the hypothesised dialecticism (of its causal mechanisms). This follows recent 
suggestions in the EU literature by, amongst others, March and Olsen (1998), Aspinwall and 
Schneider (2000) and Checkel (2001b), and has been argued to be profitable when we are 
attempting to ground claims of one theory into the foundation of other (Jupille et al., 2003), as 
is the case of my model (since I ground rationalist claims within the institutionalist foundation 
of socialisation into identity and/or roles of behaviour).  Consequently, selected upon the 
understanding that these are inherently conducive to both (strategic and bounded/appropriate) 
rationalities of behavioural action, I argue that compatibility, recency and chronological 
                                                 
28   Ockham’s (or Occam’s) razor principle, attributed to the 14th-century English scholastic philosopher 
William of Ockham, states that “in explaining a thing no more assumptions should be made than are 
necessary” (OED, 2002: 1972). 
29  Due to the fact that the ‘socialisation’ effects of my model juxtapose two (partially competing) sets of 
cognitive scripts, its operationalisation must take into account not only cognitive, but also integrative, 
effects of its socialisation mechanisms.   
30  Even though literature maintains that (even a small degree of) logic of appropriateness within a 
hypothesized model can present methodological challenges for generation of exclusive and testable 
hypotheses (Peters, 1999), leading to (potential) subsequent analytical difficulties (Yin, 2003), I nonetheless 
believe that the analytical richness of effects modeled also on (a degree) of (limited) appropriateness 
balances out methodological difficulties tied with establishing its empirical validation.  
31  As delineated in the theretical chapter of this thesis, model’s ‘two-step’ incorporation involves first the 
incorporation of Goffman’s sociological concepts of social environment and ‘manipulation and morality’ 
into the rational choice institutionalism to account for calculations of social benefits, and second the 
incorporation of the modified rational choice mechanism and socio-institutionalist account of role-induced 
decisional behaviour.    
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primacy of organisational structures, education, and the intensity and noviceness (of exposure) 
are the relevant scope conditions to delineate the applicability of such incorporative 
synthesis.32
 
Finally, it is important to point out that the (methodological) choice to follow a limited 
incorporation approach has direct implications with regard to the possibilities of, and 
strategies for, assessing the empirical validity (and robustness) of my theoretical model.33  
That is, by drawing on multiple theories and limiting the validity of thus constructed 
theoretical models to a range of specific scope conditions, Popper’s notion of falsification 
(Fetzer, 1993) is preferable to that of verification, since it identifies the “applicability bounds” 
of theories in question (King et al., 1994: 101).  Still, it is clear that I here understand 
falsification more in terms of Lakatos’ (1970) pragmatic reading of Popper’s tenet.  Posited 
concisely, Lakatos (1970) argues that in testing the relative validity of a theory, empirical 
observations contradicting its expected patterns do not invalidate it in its entirety, but rather 
identify particular scope conditions under which this theory may be valid (Motterlini, 1999; 
italics added).  Hence, complete verification or falsification of model’s synthesized theory 
thus is not intended in my analysis.  Rather, I rely on conditional validity (or partial 
falsification).  Even though uncovering the conditional validity of hypothesized dialecticism 
(between specified social mechanisms) may allow only for partial falsification of the 
synthesized theory, application of this weak notion of falsification ought to still be acceptable 
for critical testing of theories within social sciences.  The reason, following Elster (1989), is 
that the mere existence and applicability of general laws are difficult to detect within social 
life and that statements regarding general and universal validity might thus well be untenable.  
Given this impossibility to proclaim universal validity, Elster (1989) further argues that only 
conditional validity (or partial refutation) is possible. 
 
 
                                                 
32  Theoretical implications of such ‘incorporation’, concerning the problems of absorption of ‘weaker’ theories 
are discussed in the appropriate section of theoretical Chapter Two.     
33  Contemporary studies of the European Union show a bias towards validation of theoretical arguments by 
verification rather than falsification.  That is, scholars systematically attempt to support, i.e. verify, their 
theoretical argument, rather than make an extensive effort to test various theoretical approaches’ relative 
validity – i.e. falsify them (Trondal, 2001; Jupille et al., 2003; Jupille, 2005; Keeler, 2005). Despite this bias 
towards verification, testing by falsification is often presented as a more viable alternative, because it 
“derives from the logical impossibility of verifying general arguments on the basis of verifying singular 
arguments” (Hovi and Rasch, 1996).  Indeed, one can wonder how many supportive tests are sufficient to 
‘accept’ a theory (cf. King et al., 1994). 
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3.2 Study Design at Empirical Level 
Although the core contribution of this project involves development of a new (bridge-
building) theoretical framework to analyse the (micro) processes of integration, once such 
framework is developed, it should be subjected to empirical testing (King et al., 1994).  Still, 
a complete test of a dialectic model of the kind presented here requires extensive statistical 
data, which were beyond the reach of this thesis.  Hence, I will merely provide a limited-
sample empirical illustration of predictions deriving from the theoretical model.  This is 
performed using data concerning Seconded National Experts (SNEs) in the European 
Commission.  More specifically, the empirical analysis – carried out in Chapter Four – tackles 
the question of what shapes SNE decision-making behaviour during secondment in the 
Commission: i.e. the interaction (rather than singularity) of strategic action and role-play.  In 
discussing the empirical approach below, I first describe the data and method of analysis (i.e. 
qualitative embedded single-case case-study research design, using semi-structured interviews 
and text analysis).  Then, I explain the reasons to concentrate on SNEs in the Commission 
(including reflections on potential self-selection, non-random and non-representative 
sampling, together with internal and external validity).  Finally, I consider the more technical, 
but crucial, issue of causality (versus correlation).  
 
3.2.1  Method of analysis 
My empirical analysis is of a predominantly qualitative nature.  That is, it “relies on verbal (as 
opposed to symbolic or mathematical) presentation and primarily (though not exclusively) on 
non-numerical data” (Jupille, 2005: 214; see also King et al., 1994; Bryman, 2004).  Both 
qualitative and quantitative approaches clearly have their merits – and stumbling blocks (for a 
discussion, see King et al., 1994; Bryman, 2004: 75-79 and Bryman, 2004: 279-288).  
Neither, however, is intrinsically superior to the other as regards the basic goal of any 
scientific research, which is “to make descriptive or explanatory inferences” (King et al., 
1994: 7; Van Evera, 1997).  The reasons why I focus on qualitative research methods in the 
present analysis are threefold.   
 
i) While my theoretical model clearly motivates and structures the design and data of 
the subsequent empirical analysis, one of the crucial purposes of that empirical 
work is to further develop the theory, which is a characteristic feature of most 
qualitative research (Bryman, 2004: 266).  That is, further “theoretical elaboration 
[is to] emerge out of the data collection” and analysis (Bryman, 2004: 287).   
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ii) The research subject – i.e. the micro-processes of norm internalisation – is not 
readily conducive to quantification or transfer into numbers amenable to statistical 
analysis.  Indeed, my preoccupation concerns the ‘process’ of socialisation.  Such 
emphasis on “social life in terms of processes” is predominantly addressed by 
qualitative research (Bryman, 2004: 281).   
 
iii) The interaction of social mechanisms studied here has not been subject to 
extensive empirical scrutiny before. This, on the one hand, necessitates sufficient 
flexibility in the research design to accommodate (minor) modifications and 
extensions of the research focus. Qualitative research is often deemed more 
flexible and amenable to changes of focus throughout the research (Bryman, 2004: 
282-283). On the other hand, the relative lack of prior research implies that the 
present analysis can also be seen as a limited-case pilot-study, in which the 
detailed, in-depth nature of qualitative research (Bryman, 2004: 287) is essential. 
Later research can then build upon my data, findings and interpretations to, if 
desired, generate fully structured survey questionnaires or other, more quantitative 
research designs.34 
 
The main tool employed in the analysis is text analysis of transcripts of semi-structured 
interviews with thirteen current Norwegian, Swedish, Dutch, British and Polish SNEs in the 
European Commission (for reasons and methods of case selection, see below).  The 
interviews, for which field-work occurred in the period March/April 2007, were semi-
structured to allow for flexibility in terms of the interview guide, while at the same time 
maintaining sufficient influence on the topics discussed (Bryman, 2004). Additional, 
complementary topics raised by the interviewees throughout the interviews could thus be 
incorporated in later interviews and become an integral part of the study and its findings.  
Hence, rather than be rigid and fully pre-determined in terms of interview structure, the 
interviews were of a discursive and open-ended nature, albeit guided by the (pre-determined, 
though flexible) inventory of elements to be discussed.  This naturally implies that not all 
topics are covered in the same order in all interviews, and that some topics may be covered 
                                                 
34  This obviously does not imply that I believe there is a hierarchy in research designs with qualitative research 
of necessity being ‘preliminary’ to quantitative studies (as is all too commonly assumed; see Jupille, 2005).  
This should, however, not negate the fact that in-depth qualitative research can provide crucial information 
and insights to develop more structured, quantitative research designs amenable to large-N studies. 
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more extensively in some interviews compared to others.35  All interviews were conducted 
face-to-face (with one exception, which was conducted via telephone due to time constraints 
and work-related travel of the interviewee at the time of the interview), as facial expressions 
and general body language may provide important additional information (impossible to 
obtain through telephone or online interviews) (Bryman, 2004: 477-478).  Finally, all thirteen 
were conducted, recorded and transcribed by myself, such that inter-interviewer (and inter-
transcriber) variability was not an issue.  
 
This primary data source of thirteen self-conducted interviews was extended with a secondary 
source consisting of two elements.  Firstly, I was able to use transcripts of further thirteen 
interviews of Norwegian and Swedish SNEs, conducted in 2004-2005 by Profs. Jarle Trondal 
and Torbjörn Larsson.36  Secondly, I had access to three previous papers on SNE socialisation 
by Prof. Trondal (i.e. Trondal, 2006a, 2007; Trondal et al., 2007). As a consequence, I 
triangulate three sets of empirical sources (both primary and secondary), encompassing 
interviews (both secondary – Trondal and Larsson, 2004-2005 – and my own) and survey data 
(derived from Trondal, 2006a, 2007).  Ultimately, the current use of these various data-
sources thus also invokes a multi-approach design and triangulation of methods.  This follows 
the suggestion that the use of various methodological approaches to study social phenomena 
is a necessity if we are to “understand the rapidly changing social world” (King et al., 1994: 
5-6). This benefit of multi-methodological work holds all the more in socialisation research 
(Checkel, 2005a; Jupille, 2005).  
 
3.2.2  Case selection 
The empirical analysis, as mentioned, concentrates on the decision-making behaviour of a 
specific group of technocrats in the European Commission (i.e. national experts, seconded 
there on temporary contracts).  This effectively implies a double choice.  On the one hand, I 
look at the European Commission rather than (a set of) other international institutions. On the 
                                                 
35  Some topics may even fall off the table altogether in certain interviews.  The reason is that respondents 
should be left to talk freely whenever possible and abrupt shifts of attention to broach a new topic ideally are 
to be avoided.  Hence, the interviewer should keep careful stock of what has been discussed, and what 
remains to be discussed. This is preferably done mentally since, for example, ticking items off on a list not 
only distracts respondents, but might also create the impression that ‘all has been said on this topic’. 
36  While similarly concerned with issues of SNE socialisation, this data was, nonetheless, collected from a 
somewhat different research focus (i.e. influence of organisational structures). Consequently, the resulting 
data has slightly reduced applicability, which – if not employed with care – can decrease the internal validity 
of the study. However, since its main purpose is providing a test of robustness for my primary data, I argue 
this justifies its inclusion.   
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other hand, I focus on SNEs rather than permanent officials.  Both choices need to be 
defended. 
 
Although it has been argued that selection of one single case for analysis is often less than 
ideal and rarely allows for general inferences (King et al., 1994), I concentrate exclusively on 
integration of SNEs in the European Commission.  This choice is driven by the fact that the 
European Union (EU) – and especially the European Commission – constitutes a ‘best-case’ 
situation.  Indeed, since socialising effects of structure upon actors’ properties and decision-
making behaviour are borne only in environments defined by a high density of 
institutionalisation (Checkel, 2005a; Johnston, 2005; Trondal, 2006a), this singles out the 
European Commission as the ‘best-case’ situation when analysing international organisations.  
The Commission – vested as it is with key initialising powers and the “authority to select and 
groom its employees with minimal national interference” – elicits “strong reasons to expect 
(…) international socialisation to be effective” (Hooghe, 2005: 862).  Moreover, being the 
administrative apparatus of the EU, this level of governance exhibits a multitude of 
intervening characteristics (such as, for example, multi-culturalism, multi-linguism and multi-
level system of governance), which makes it less likely for civil servants to retain their 
‘domestic’ identities, role conceptions and modes of acting.  While a ‘most-likely’ case such 
as the Commission provides a weak test for verification of a theory, it provides a strong case 
for falsification (if a theory fails when being confronted with the ‘most-likely’ case, it is 
unlikely to deserve further scrutiny; King et al., 1994).  As such, analysing the European 
Commission as the ‘most-likely’ case provides valuable information (Eckstein, 1975; Yin, 
2003), especially given my focus on (partial) falsification (cf. supra).  I therefore follow this 
convention in the previous literature and concentrate on socialisation in the European 
Commission. 
 
Unlike most previous work, however, I analyse the behaviour of national experts seconded to 
the European Commission on temporary contracts.37 These have, surprisingly, received little 
attention in the socialisation and Europeanisation literature (for exceptions, see Trondal, 
2006a, 2007; Trondal et al., 2007).  Nonetheless, SNEs have a number of defining features 
that make them highly interesting for socialisation research: 
 
                                                 
37  By taking multiple SNEs up in the analysis, my empirical analysis can be defined as an embedded single 
case study (Yin, 2003: 40, my italics). 
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i) SNEs – by the nature of secondment contracts – are only temporarily (maximum 
four years) detached to an (European) institution.  This is important since the 
intensity (as well as length and/or quality) of ‘exposure’ is often seen as a crucial 
determinant of socialisation (e.g., Hooghe, 2005; Lewis, 2005; Trondal, 2006a).   
 
ii) During their secondment, SNEs should “carry out their duties and behave solely 
with the interest of the Commission in mind” (Commission rules for SNEs, 2004; 
Art. 7:1), while they “continue to be paid by their employer” (ibid; Art. 1:2).  
SNEs thus have an “ambiguous organisational embeddedness” (Trondal, 2006a: 
156).  Crucially for my purpose, this questions the possibility of supplanting one 
(national) role by another (supranational) role, since it implies that the SNEs have 
to simultaneously navigate between two sets of role-expectations (which can 
(arguably) allow for a degree of rationality in evaluating one against the other 
under specific contexts).  
 
iii) SNEs – should they wish to return to their home institution after their secondment 
– have to be taken back by this institution at a rank at least equal to the one they 
had upon leaving on secondment.   
 
iv) SNEs are a ten-percent minority of Commission’s 11.263 policy-making 
administrators (Statistical Bulletin on Commission Staff, 01/07).   
 
v) SNEs do not have the same powers as permanent European staff (cf. Trondal, 
2006a).38   
 
The first three characteristics make SNEs ‘least-likely’ cases for behavioural adaptation – 
providing a harsh test for structural effects (that is, if one observes the ‘appropriate’ behaviour 
within this group, it provides strong evidence in favour of Commission’s socialising influence 
(cf. Eckstein, 1975; King et al., 1994; Yin, 2003).  The latter two elements, however, leave 
SNEs susceptible to considerable social pressure (even policing) by the Commission to 
conform to its normative structures (as any benefits of their posting are, arguably, attributable 
                                                 
38  For example, they are not allowed to sign financial decisions, nor should they represent the Commission on 
an official basis without the presence of a permanent member of staff (though the enforcement of the latter 
rule can in practice be, sometimes, left to an individual Head’s of Unit judgement).  
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to their ability and will to conform). This, in turn, entails that both role-playing and strategic 
action can be stimulated.  Since the theoretical model is structured to look at the interplay 
between these two social mechanisms, SNEs are, thereby, a perfect test case for it.  Moreover, 
the duality and temporarity of their embeddedness is central to testing whether supranational 
institutions unambiguously eclipse the effects of prior domestic socialization, i.e. whether re-
socialisation is singularly triggered off by the effects of Commission’s organisational 
structures (as argued in Haas, 1958; Egeberg and Trondal, 1997; Laffan, 1998; Egeberg, 
1999b), or whether they are porous enough to allow for effects of strategic optimizing (of 
‘appropriate’ behaviour).  Hence, my focus on SNEs is justified in the empirical illustration of 
my theoretical model. Moreover, focusing on their behaviour is thus also in compliance with 
required internal validity of my overall research design.39
 
The initial aim was to gather data by interviewing twelve SNEs of possibly varying 
nationality and length-of-stay within the Commission.  Although twelve respondents were 
deemed the minimum number necessary to achieve reliable results (note that I also had access 
to a secondary data source with thirteen additional respondents; cf. supra), more interviews 
were unfeasible due to time and resource constraints.  Moreover, for practical reasons 
concerning travel and interview location, potential respondents needed to be stationed in 
Brussels.40 Bringing together these twelve respondents was, however, made significantly 
more difficult by the absence of a complete list of SNEs to be addressed.  That is, while a 
complete list of all current SNEs exists and is maintained by CLENAD (the organisation 
defending the rights of SNEs), this list is not public.  This first of all makes it very difficult to 
gain access to SNEs and acquire their cooperation. Secondly, it implies that, while 
information is publicly available on the size of the SNE population (cf. supra), no information 
on the characteristics of this population (for example, in terms of the distribution of SNEs 
over nationalities, DGs, gender, and so on) is available.  As a consequence, whatever sample 
is finally constructed, it is impossible to gauge whether or not this constitutes a representative 
sample of the total SNE population.  I discuss the consequences of this problem for the 
external validity and generality of my study below. 
 
                                                 
39  Nonetheless, the basic tenets of the theoretical model should be equally supported among permanent staff of 
the Commission (or other international institutions for that matter).   
40  By design, some DGs, such as DG SANCO, EAC or ADMIN, etc, have offices also in Luxemburg.   
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Given that a complete list of SNEs thus was not available, individual respondents in my study 
were selected via a snowballing routine using two separate routes.   
 
i) I emailed a letter with a plea for participation in a scientific study (see Appendix 2) 
to twenty-four Scandinavian SNEs (currently – i.e. march 2007) seconded to the 
Commission through the EFTA organisation.  I compiled this list from names 
available on the official EFTA website. I received fifteen responses (response rate 
of 62,5 percent) in total. Interestingly, it included a positive response from all nine 
(hence response rate of 100 percent) Norwegian SNEs (which, perhaps, suggests 
an initial manifestation of self-selection bias toward ‘helping one of us’). The 
remaining five offers came from three Swedish and two Islandic SNEs. 
Unfortunately, there were no responses from Finnish SNEs. While the response 
rate for Islanders was 100 percent (cross-checked on a later point with the Islandic 
embassy in Brussels), the response rate for Swedish SNEs wasn’t possible to 
establish due to the fact that SNEs’ e-mail addresses do not indicate nationalities 
(hence out of thirteen remaining SNEs on my original name list, it was not 
possible – apart from the obviously Finnish names – to establish who is Swedish, 
and who is of Finnish, nationality). From the total pool of fifteen positive 
responses, I selected four Norwegian respondents stationed in Brussels (their stay 
ranging from six months to three years). Both Icelanders and one Swedish SNEs, 
unfortunately, were stationed in Luxemburg rather than Brussels and thus could 
not be retained in the sample. I accepted offers from both remaining, Brussels-
based, Swedish SNEs (first, and last, semester in the initial two-year contract). In 
the next step, all fifteen respondents were then asked whether they had any SNE-
colleagues of other than Scandinavian nationality and whether it would be possible 
to obtain their contact details.  This generated the name and contact details of two 
French SNEs who never answered my request, and one Dutch SNE (of Irish 
origin).  This person was subsequently contacted and agreed to both participate in 
the study, and to provide two additional names of Dutch SNEs.  Both were, in 
turn, contacted and agreed to participate (thus an overall ‘Dutch’ response rate of 
100 percent; however – as with the Norwegian sample – (arguably) susceptible to 
self-selection bias).  
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ii) To complete my sample, I needed further three names. Therefore I contacted the 
permanent missions of all twenty-five remaining member-states plus Iceland (the 
Dutch and Swedish Permanent Missions were not contacted as I was at that time 
attempting to include SNEs of other nationalities than those already in the sample), 
requesting information and, if possible, contact details of SNEs of their respective 
nationalities. This led to response from six missions: French, British, Polish, 
Rumanian, Bulgarian and Icelandic. The Icelandic embassy offered two names, 
both of which, however, were of SNEs on my initial EFTA list and stationed in 
Luxemburg. Bulgarian and Rumanian missions informed me that at the present 
they do not have any SNEs seconded to the Commission. The Polish mission gave 
me a list of two names and the British mission forwarded my letter to all UK 
SNEs. Interestingly, the French Permanent Mission, on the other hand, first 
requested more information about the study and then unilaterally disregarded my 
request.41  None of the other permanent missions acknowledged my request (and 
hence a very low response rate of 23 percent).  Consequently, I contacted both 
named Polish SNEs (using the letter mentioned above) and one agreed to 
participate in the study (response rate of 50 percent).  I also obtained nine 
responses from British SNEs (the response rate here is impossible to assess, as I 
never gained information about the exact number of British SNEs) and selected 
three of these (again based on their length of stay in the Commission (i.e. eight 
months, halfway through the initial two-year contract, and nearing the end of the 
extended period). 
 
The final sample employed thus contains thirteen respondents: four Norwegians, two Swedes, 
three Dutch, three British, and one Pole.   
 
The method employed to obtain the respondents implies there is a clear problem of non-
random selection and non-representativeness of the sample (Bryman, 2004: 102).  This raises 
obvious concerns about the external validity and general nature of the findings of the analysis.  
However, given the qualitative set-up of the study (cf. supra) and my primary interest in 
                                                 
41  The French attitude is interesting, since it can be perceived as indicative of the lack of autonomy of French 
SNEs (which could be, arguably, corroborated by the case of ‘non-answers’ of the two French SNEs, 
contacted by me directly). This interpretation was, importantly, later supported by several of my 
interviewees, who have French SNE-colleagues in their units. This is also consistent with information noted 
in my secondary source, i.e. in the transcripts of thirteen Scandinavian SNEs, interviewed by Trondal and 
Larson in 2004-5.  
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analytical rather than statistical generalization, this is not a critical problem (Bryman, 2004: 
102).  Potentially of larger concern, however, is that there is also an element of self-selection 
in the final sample.  Respondents were addressed by letter and then independently decided to 
either become an informant to the study, or not.  It might well be that mainly SNEs at the 
extremes of the socialisation distribution (i.e. very high or very low socialisation) are more 
likely to respond to my request – as these are likely to care more about the issue and be more 
willing to share their experience.  It is, however, extremely difficult to ascertain a priori 
whether this is actually the case (and, if so, which group is most likely to do so).  Hence, the 
effects of such (potential) self-selection problem on the results of my analysis are, a priori, 
hard to predict.  Nevertheless, my selection of respondents from the set of candidates did not 
rely on their (perceived) conformity of behaviour in line with Commission norms and rules 
(which was unknown to me at the time).  As such, selection was unrelated to the central 
variables of the present study.  Potential bias deriving from this self-selection should, 
however, be closely monitored in the data analysis to ensure reliability of the study.42
 
Finally, it should be mentioned that the majority of selected respondents showed interest in 
the results of the study.  This provides the opportunity to present them an account of my 
(initial) observations and receive their corroboration or comments. This process of 
“respondent validation” (Bryman, 2004: 275) gives the possibility to attest the 
correspondence between my findings and the perspective of the respondents. While not 
without practical difficulties (e.g., defensive reactions of respondents, reluctance to be critical, 
and so on), it can provide additional credibility to my findings or provide additional insights. 
 
3.2.3.  Causality 
According to King et al. (1994: 86), “identifying the mechanisms by which a cause has its 
effect (…) is a very useful operational procedure”.  This is effectively the ultimate goal of my 
model: namely, to determine and illustrate a set of causal inferences about micro-level 
integration (through the specification of social mechanisms; cf. supra).  The identification of 
such “causal mechanisms requires causal inference”, which makes the concept of causality of 
vital importance (King et al., 1994: 86; Hellevik, 1998; Yin, 2003; Bryman, 2004). The 
                                                 
42  There is a second potential source of self-selection bias, which refers to individuals’ decision to become an 
SNE.  Out of thirteen SNEs in my sample, only one had been head-hunted by the appropriate ministry. The 
remaining twelve applied either directly to the heads of relevant units, had seen a vacancy on the intranets of 
their work places or had been informed that such an opening became available.  The same occurs in my 
secondary data source: eight SNEs themselves applied for a position, while only two were asked to apply. 
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notion of causality – which pertains to establishing causal connections between variables, or 
those ‘cogs and wheels’ linking different events together (Elster, 1989) – can be seen as 
resting upon the proof of proximity in time and space of analysed events (King et al., 1994).  
Depending on the research strategy, the methodological literature identifies two ways of 
verifying its presence: i) statistically – by measuring empirically observable chains of 
correlations between events, or ii) by application of a replication logic on several sufficiently 
similar cases, which – if all cases turn out as predicted – provides compelling support for the 
initial set of propositions (Yin, 2003).  
 
Still, proximity in time and space are insufficient to establish proof of “true” causation (that 
is, correlation may be a necessary, but is not a sufficient condition for causality).  Other 
concerns pertaining “true” causality must be addressed, such as statistical control for (and 
elimination of) possible co-variation and spuriousness (i.e. the impact of a third variable on 
each of the two variables in the analysed relationship), or demand for a rich theoretical 
framework, necessary to identify scope conditions, under which a particular phenomenon is 
both likely, and not likely to be found (Bryman, 2004; Yin, 2003).  
 
Following this line of argument, throughout this thesis, I adhere to the notion of causality as a 
purely theoretical construct, impossible to observe with certainty empirically (Hellevik, 1988; 
King et al., 1994; Jacobsen, 2002; Bryman, 2004). As such, the only way to prove it in 
empirical analyses is indirectly. More specifically, when from a theoretical point of view a 
phenomenon A can only be related to a phenomenon B as ‘A causing B’ (thus implying the 
theoretical impossibility of ‘B causing A’), then a “persistent statistical correlation (…) [is] 
strongly indicative of a causal relation of some sort” between A and B (Salmon in Trondal, 
2001: 91), and thus ought to be accepted as a weak validation of (theoretically argued) causal 
inferences. 
 
Given that Elster’s (1989) concept of ‘cogs and wheels’ (linking different events together) is 
synonymous with the notion of social mechanisms – which are, according to Hedström and 
Sweberg (1998) “unobservable analytical constructs” – the above argumentation implies that 
any causal explanation of events linked together by these mechanisms can be validated only 
theoretically. Thus I argue that the above-mentioned empirical validation method of causality 
applies also to the causality explanations involving social mechanisms. Consequently, since 
my thesis aims to illustrate its theoretical causal assumptions regarding to the social 
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mechanisms’ analyses, it has to do so by measuring correlations of chosen variables, and by 
empirically proving scope conditions under which it is likely (and not likely) to manifest 
itself.43
 
 
 
3.3. Conclusion 
By comprehensively discussing the issues of developing a relevant and sound theoretical 
framework, and of methodological requirements for empirically testing its robustness, I 
maintain to have touched upon all the necessary requirements for conducting (responsible) 
scientific research.  Consequently, in the following chapter, I conduct an illustrative analysis 
of empirical data, collected to demonstrate the theoretical answers to thesis’ research 
question:  
 
Can actor’s decision-making behaviour within an institution – rather than singularly 
shaped either by socialising effects of organisational ‘role expectations’, or through his/her 
strategic evaluation of them – be better characterised as issuing from their dialecticism?” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
43  Clearly, though, the ultimate goal of the empirical analysis should be validation/refutation of the 
theoretically derived hypotheses.  Given the limited dataset available and the extensive data requirements to 
test a dialectic model as proposed here (cf. supra), I am constrained to merely illustrate the model. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
ANALYSIS 
How Appropriate is ‘Appropriate’? 
  
 
“It’s a zoo here, a real zoo” (Interview) 
 
Introduction 
SNEs are fully integrated into Commission’s structures. Even though only a small minority 
within its administrative body, they are called upon to supply the necessary professional 
expertise, often lacking amongst the permanent staff (for discussion, see Trondal et al., 2007). 
As one British SNE succinctly put it: “Many of the functionaries here said: “You are the only 
one who is credible here – because you are a SNE – because you are the only one who knows 
what we should be funding, because you know the country” It was a very positive view; sort 
of Thank God for the SNEs” (Interview).  Nonetheless, while thus having their worth clearly 
delineated by their knowledge, SNEs are expected to be, think, and act solely along 
Commission’s ideals and working principles. Since these can (at times) differ from their prior 
experiences and expectations, how do they adopt such ‘appropriate’ identities, roles and 
decision-making behaviour? 
 
My thesis argues that this happens through mutually interacting effects of Commission’s role 
expectations for ‘appropriate’ behaviour and SNEs’ optimising of social influence (derived 
from such behaviour). The present chapter puts forth an empirical illustration of this 
argument. However – as mentioned above, and further discussed below – the sample size is 
much too small to allow for empirical testing of the model. Rather, the following empirical 
analysis mostly illustrates how one could test such model – as well as it provides a first 
impression concerning its empirical predictions.  
 
The present Chapter is structured in three main parts.  Section 4.1 first illuminates that both 
constituting factors of my model (i.e. strategic action and role-playing) are actually 
individually present.  Then, Section 4.2 analyses the six calibrated hypotheses, thus 
illustrating how both social mechanisms interact with one another.  Finally, Section 4.3 
briefly summarizes and discusses the main findings. 
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4.1. Social Influence and Socialisation through ‘Appropriate’ Roles  
As traditionally theorised, there are two main rationales for adopting ‘appropriate’ behaviour: 
i) strategic optimising of costs and benefits (of such behaviour), or ii) structural socialisation. 
My thesis goes one step further and argues that these rationales should be combined rather 
than singled out.  Of crucial importance, however, is to first establish their individual presence 
and influence upon the processes of actors’ behavioural adaptation; only then can I attempt to 
account for their relationship. Consequently, this section is designed to offer (some) empirical 
substantiation of both effects.   
 
4.1.1. Mechanism of Strategic Action:  Social Influence 
“Could this be seen as a career advancement?  
It has to be; otherwise what am I doing here?” 
(Interview) 
 
In the strictest sense, there is no behaving appropriately for the homo economicus.  Instead, 
(s)he adopts the behavioural rules following social or material incentives. Since such 
behavioural adoption is guided by logic of consequences, it does not require internalisation of 
norms. Homo economicus, per definition, is strategic and self-reflective (Juncos and 
Pomorska, 2006).  In my setting, this implies that SNEs will behave in accordance with 
Commission’s norms and rules after they – at a certain point in time – strategically evaluated 
the value of such behaviour and decided that benefits outweigh the costs. Consequently, 
SNEs’ strategic optimising (of ‘appropriate’ behaviour) is operationalised as their seeking of 
social influence.  Since this is measured via i) career possibilities and ii) professional contact 
networks, the strategic rationale for adoption of Commission-specific behaviour would be to 
increase SNEs’ chances of furthering their career and gaining useful contact networks (RC 
Hypothesis; cf. supra). 
 
i) I found a sound overall support for this mechanism. When investigating the first proxy of 
career possibilities, all thirteen SNEs of my primary sample (100 percent) readily admit that 
they work in the Commission for professional and career reasons: “I think it is good for my 
profile. I need some new experiences on my CV, and I think this would look good.” 
(Interview) or “What else? Otherwise what am I doing here?” (Interview). The same finding 
transpired in the secondary data set. From thirteen respondents of Profs. Trondal and Larsson 
available to me, eleven (85 percent) viewed secondment as a good opportunity for 
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advancement of their careers. A representative answer here was: “To have three years of 
international experience on one’s CV will help you in one way or other.”  Only one 
respondent was absolutely sure that the secondment would not lead to a promotion or career 
advancement after secondment.  
 
Interestingly, the British SNEs in my primary data source gave the most business-like and 
direct answers. That is, while most non-British SNEs (i.e. seven out of ten) tried to modify 
these career views with additional explanations such as “needed new challenges”, “being 
bored” or “not stretched enough” in their pre-secondment posts, or wanting to also “know 
how things are working from the ‘other’ [i.e. European] side” (Interview), all three British 
SNEs were unambiguous about the future ‘usefulness’ of their secondment.44  
 
The importance of career prospects to SNEs is further illustrated by the fact that most SNEs 
complain of a lack of ‘home’ interest for their experience. Only one third of my primary 
respondents (four SNEs, or 31 percent), and two of the secondary (15 percent) were satisfied 
with the interest their home institutions have shown so far – leaving more than three quarters 
of SNEs in both samples (twenty out of 26, or 77 percent) frustrated: “It would give me some 
visibility, but they have no interest in the information I could provide” (Interview). This is 
supported also by my textual source (Trondal et al., 2007: 19), quoting from a CLENAD 
report: “According to the study by the staff organisation for SNEs [it] appears that the SNEs 
often return to vacant posts which have limited relevance to the knowledge and skills gained 
on the secondment”. 
 
Finally, it is of interest to mention that only two of the thirteen SNEs within my primary data 
set (15 percent) mention losing out on internal promotions while on secondment, while this 
concern appears not to be voiced at all in the secondary dataset.45 Their answers could be 
summarised thus: “You go abroad and then it’s nice in a way, but your career stands still and 
when you return home you are… everybody is a step further but you return to your old job” 
(Interview). Such composition of answers suggests that the hoped-for career possibilities 
gained from secondment outweigh SNEs’ perception of ‘normal’ promotion possibilities back 
                                                 
44  This might well reflect the Euro-scepticism both of Great Britain and the British population in general. 
Moreover, it also testifies to the strong ‘business approach’ culture within the British public administration 
(used by one of the SNEs to explain his view on the perceived deficiencies of the Commission’s 
administration).  
45  A possible explanation might be that, as the interviews in the secondary data-source were conducted with a 
slightly different research aim, it was simply not included in the (rather concise) transcripts available to me. 
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home. This interpretation is also supported by SNEs’ perceived lack of challenges back home 
(cf. supra).  
 
ii) Regarding the second proxy – professional and social contact networks – further support 
for the social influence mechanism is unveiled.  All thirteen SNEs in the primary data source 
(100 percent) maintain that networks are not only a way of working, but also have future 
value. When asked about supranational contacts as ‘future investment’, more than three 
quarters of interviewees (ten SNEs out of 13, or 78 percent) answered affirmative: “People 
are working here to create networks, and a lot of SNEs are going back to their own countries 
and they set up their own private business, because they have this network” (Interview), 
“When I come back I will have a lot of contacts within the EU institutions, so I would like to 
be perceived as more important” (Interview). Similarly, more than half of respondents from 
the secondary source (seven SNEs or 54 percent) attest the ‘future usefulness’ of networks 
One said that: “Even though many claim that the expertise of SNEs isn’t used once they are 
back, people come home, after all, and can contribute with contacts and such” (Interview), 
while a second admitted: “Yeah, my contact-net had become much bigger; this is one of the 
plusses in this work. And the contact network doesn’t disappear, after all. Not sure yet when 
I’ll go back, but it would be weird not to use them” (Interview). 
 
The main contacts gained by SNEs are within the respective units and DGs; additionally, they 
also mention other SNEs and  “field organisations” (Interview). Intergovernmental contacts 
are, however, limited and mostly constrained to governments of countries that are not their 
own. The majority (eight SNEs in my sample; 62 percent) has very little, or no contacts with 
home, save for that initiated by SNEs themselves: “I really miss the contacts… you need to 
know what’s going on, really.” (Interview), or “While in Brussels, I am not sure how will my 
network survive. I try to keep in touch, but all I get from my boss is “Sorry, I am too busy” 
(Interview). This picture of the ‘absent’ home country thus concurs closely to that drawn 
above concerning the usefulness of their expertise (though the answers here are not 
differentiated enough to assess whether, and how many, SNEs see it as disadvantageous to 
their career).  Finally, when discussing their social contacts, it transpires that the main contact 
line here is along the respective nationalities: “Mostly Scandinavians and Norwegians. Not 
other nationalities, not really” (Interview). 
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Cross-checking with my textual source, the information both on the type of supranational 
contacts and the lack of domestic contacts corroborates with mine.  For example, Trondal et 
al. (2007: 20, italics added) note that “most contacts between SNEs and their home 
administration was a result of the initiatives of the SNEs, partly to allow the organisation to 
benefit from the experience they were gaining, partly in order not to be forgotten and thus 
hoping to boost their career opportunities upon return”. 
 
To conclude, it is obvious that both career and contacts are important to SNEs. While, across 
both datasets, an overwhelming majority of twenty-four out of 26 (or 92 percent) SNEs feel 
that secondment is beneficial for their careers, two-thirds (seventeen out of 26, or 65 percent) 
also stipulate the beneficial value of their supranational contacts. Both effects are slightly 
more prevalent in my primary dataset. Hence, the data clearly illustrate the presence of the 
mechanism of strategic calculation in SNEs, for whom social influence from secondment is an 
asset to be striven for and cultivated.    
 
4.1.2. Mechanism of Structural Socialisation: Role-Playing 
 “Professionally I do what is expected of me”  
(Interview) 
 
Homo politicus behaves ‘appropriately’: either because ‘it is right’, or because ‘that’s the way 
things are done here’. As the introductory quote suggests, it is the latter rationale that stands 
central to this section (the former refers to Checkel’s Type II internalisation, which is left 
outside my theoretical model; cf. supra). Organisation theory explains that actors, due to their 
limited cognitive capacities, require the guidance of organisationally specific role 
expectations to make ‘appropriate’ decisions (Egeberg, 2004). Inasmuch as the Commission is 
designed along the principles of purpose, process and territory (cf. supra), SNEs’ behaviour 
will be shaped by the following four (ideational) behavioural roles: i) departmental (i.e. SNEs 
as representatives of their unit and/or DG); ii) epistemic (SNEs as independent experts); iii) 
national (SNEs as their government’s representatives) and iv) supranational (SNEs working 
for Commission as a whole).46  These can be measured via four different elements: loyalty, 
mandate, preferences and concerns and ethics (cf. Trondal, 2006a) (See Table 1). 
                                                 
46  Departmental Role entails no politico-administrative control, only “administrative rules and procedures 
codified in portfolios”. Epistemic Role has no politico-administrative leadership, only “professional 
expertise and the educational background, loosely knit to fixed mandates from the Commission and the 
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Table 1: Dimension of ‘Appropriate’ SNE Decision-Making  
Measure 
Departmental 
Role 
Epistemic 
Role 
National 
Role 
Supranational 
Role 
Loyalty To Own  
Portfolio 
Discipline 
(Field of study) 
To the Home 
Government 
To The 
Commission  
Mandate Department and 
Unit Rules 
Professional 
Discretion 
By Home 
Government 
Commission 
Leadership 
Preferences Dept. Concerns 
and Preferences 
Professional 
Preferences 
Dom. Concerns 
and Preferences 
For the  
Common Good 
Ethics Departmental 
Ethics 
Professional 
Ethics 
Diplomatic 
Ethic 
Community 
Ethics 
Note: Adapted from Trondal (2006a: 148) 
 
i) When asked about their loyalties while working in the Commission, the answer within my 
primary dataset was almost evenly split between all four roles (for one SNE, no information 
about loyalty is available). One third of interviewees (four SNEs; 25 percent) see themselves 
foremost as experts: “Yeah, I am a seconded expert; and my loyalty is to my profession” 
(Interview).  Another four (one third) see themselves as loyal to their DG or unit: “My loyalty 
is only to the projects we are doing here at the unit” (Interview).  Five (38 percent) explicitly 
mention their loyalty to the Commission as a whole: “I am pretty loyal to the Commission” 
(Interview). Finally, three (23 percent) remain loyal to their home-country: “I mean you sign 
contract that you will work a hundred percent for the European Commission, which is true, 
but I get my salary from Norway, so…” (Interview), “Nominally, it [loyalty] lies with this 
DG; but my real loyalty lies with the [British] Treasury” (Interview).   
 
Interestingly, in certain cases, SNEs show a ‘composite’ of loyalties.  That is, two SNEs in 
my primary sample supplement their epistemic loyalty with additional loyalty to portfolio (17 
percent), one (8 percent) exhibits both departmental and supranational loyalties and one (8 
percent) combines epistemic with supranational loyalties. Such ‘composite’ understanding of 
SNEs’ loyalties is also observed in my textual source: “We observe an inbuilt conflict 
between the role as a departmental official (‘DG/Unit Representative’), an epistemic official 
                                                                                                                                                        
member-state leadership”. Supranational Role involves “Commission’s politico-administrative leadership” 
and “strong ‘cosmopolitan’ identity”. National Role requires government mandate, territorial identities, 
preferences and loyalties (Trondal, 2006a: 148). 
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(‘Independent Expert’) and a supranational official (‘Commission representative’) among 
SNEs” (Trondal, 2006a: 156).   
 
The secondary data show a more clear-cut loyalty pattern. An overall majority of SNEs (eight, 
or 62 percent) claims allegiance to the Commission: “My loyalty lies here in the 
Commission” (Interview). While the modal category in the primary dataset is likewise 
allegiance to the Commission, the relative strength of this group is thus somewhat more 
pronounced in the secondary data source.  This comes at the cost of departmental and 
epistemic loyalties, which barely surface in this dataset.  Merely one SNE (7 percent) 
mentions loyalty to the discipline.47 The perception of being loyal to his/her home 
administration, on the other hand, shows the same tendency as in the primary dataset.  One 
third of interviewees (four SNEs, or 31 percent) profess allegiance to their home ministries.   
 
ii) The picture of mandate perceptions differs significantly from that of loyalties.  Indeed, in 
my primary dataset, no respondents mention supranational or national mandates (compared to 
eight respondents professing such a loyalty; cf. supra).  The number of SNEs stating that they 
work according to their professional judgment equals the number identifying constraints of 
departmental mandate (seven, or 54 percent, in each case). The great majority of the latter, 
however, express dissatisfaction with the feeling of being “micro-managed” (Interview) by 
the rules governing the unit and/or department: “I’m an expert. If you want to use me, don’t 
dump me into all the rules and procedures; that’s loosing the time and throwing away my 
expertise because I’m not an expert in these kinds of things” (Interview).  At the same time, 
all point out that the leadership style of their Heads (of unit) and Directors is decisive in how 
these rules are implemented. This fact has also been corroborated by my textual sources 
(Trondal, 2006a; Trondal et al., 2007).  
 
Interestingly, the differences between ‘loyalties’ and ‘mandates’ observed above for the 
primary dataset surface in broadly similar fashion in my secondary dataset.  More specifically, 
in both cases, there is a shift from Commission and national ‘loyalties’ to more professional 
                                                 
47  This need not necessarily imply that those allegiances are not present in the sample of SNEs interviewed in 
the secondary data source. As discussed earlier, I am relying on (rather compressed) transcripts of this 
secondary source that, at times, don’t offer clear-cut information.  As a consequence, they are at some points 
difficult to interpret accurately. This is further aggravated by the multi-lingual character of that data (mixed 
Swedish, English and Norwegian). Moreover, there may be a case of inter-interviewer (and inter-transcriber) 
variability at work here in the way the topic is addressed.  Hence, the difficulty of accurately 
operationalising even Type I socialisation (Zürn and Checkel, 2005: 1045) entails that combining separate 
datasets – even when concerned with very similar topics – poses serious interpretational challenges. 
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and departmental ‘mandate perceptions’ (note that there is one SNE who’s mandate could not 
be unambiguously determined from the compressed transcripts).  While one half of the 
secondary dataset (i.e. six SNEs; 50 percent) follow the Commission’s mandate (whereas 
eight, i.e. almost two-thirds, felt loyalty to it), the number of SNEs acknowledging a 
professional and departmental mandate (six in either case; or one half) is higher than those 
indicating professional and departmental loyalties (one and zero respectively).  As in the 
primary dataset, SNEs draw attention to such constraints on their work as “it’s all about 
process, not substance” (Interview), the rules are “too hierarchical” (Interview), and so on.   
Finally, while three SNEs (i.e. one quarter) were honest enough to say that its easy for them to 
follow departmental/professional mandate – because it either coincides with their national 
strategies, or they work on portfolio of no interest to their home government – no SNE 
mentioned intensions of being guided by his/her home institution.  Such reading is supported 
also by my textual source (Trondal, 2006a). 
 
iii) With respect to preferences and ethics the epistemic and departmental values again score 
highest (in line with the findings for mandates discussed above). Almost two-thirds of my 
primary dataset (eight SNEs, or 62 percent) say that – when working on their files – they have 
professional preferences: “Here is a lot of personal responsibility for the right answer, 
because there isn’t a precise legal basis for that, so you make sure… [Interviewer: Do what’s 
professionally correct?] …Yeah, that’s it.”  That consideration is closely mirrored by 
considerations of departmental preferences. Half of the SNEs (seven, or 54 percent) see 
themselves also as representing the preferences of their units – “I work here and I would stick 
to this rule” (Interview).48 Additionally, slightly less than one quarter of interviewees (three 
SNEs; 23 percent) mention that there is a clear understanding amongst the staff regarding the 
superiority of their DG, which “obliges to always perform your best” (Interview). Such ‘spirit 
of superiority’ (or an ‘elitist esprit de corps’) can be interpreted as an indirect, but clear, 
manifestation of departmental ethics. Finally, three SNEs (23 percent) – since their portfolios 
are based on a high interaction with member states – ascertain that they also invoke the 
‘community’ (i.e. the EU) ethics: “Half of the time you work for the Commission – that’s the 
                                                 
48  It should be noted that when analysing SNE preferences, it was often very difficult to clearly establish their 
ranking as answers were typically (in eleven cases, or 85 percent) a variation of: “I am an expert; 
professionally I do what is expected of me” (Interview), or “I just work as best as I can, and if I get a good 
result from my regions, then I feel I am doing really well” (Interview). These, however, do not clearly 
separate the ‘epistemic’ from ‘departmental’ preferences. However, such a ‘composite’ of preferences is 
entirely in keeping with the sectoral specialisation. 
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procedural lot, and the other way is working on the content, and that is Europe” (Interview). 
None of the SNEs mentioned ‘diplomatic’ ethics.  
 
My secondary data draws a largely similar picture regarding SNE preferences. More than half 
of SNEs (seven; 54 percent) sees their preferences as foremost departmental (most often their 
unit), but they also specify the ‘professional’ aspect of their preferences. As one Islandic SNE 
explained: “It is a mix. It depends on who you are in meeting with. I try to defend the opinion 
of this unit.”  No mention was, again, made of ‘domestic concerns and preferences’. 
Regarding the work ethics, unfortunately, this data does not offer any clear indications, thus I 
was unable to cross-reference the findings from my primary dataset in this respect.  
 
Finally, one additional information emerged from my primary data: namely, the awareness of 
many SNEs of the strategic (ab)use of departmental preferences. As one British SNE 
explains: “There are real turf wars across DGs, and also every department with DG has 
vested interests, colliding with each other… This is a real zoo here; a real zoo.” This finding 
appears to represent a cynical variant of Schattenschneider’s (1975: 30) claim that 
“organization is itself a mobilization of bias in preparation for action”.  
 
Overall, evaluating all four dimensions measuring SNEs’ ‘appropriate’ behaviour, it is evident 
that the most salient roles of behaviour amongst the SNEs are those of an independent 
(epistemic) expert and of representative of his unit/department: i.e. epistemic and 
departmental roles. The supranational role (as a representative of the Commission) comes 
third.  Like Trondal (2006a), I thus challenge previous work that stresses national loyalties 
among SNEs (e.g., Smith, 1973; Smith, 2001).  Nonetheless, many SNEs seem to have a 
composite behavioural role repertoire, which also supports Trondal’s (2006a) observation of 
SNEs’ “multi-hattedness”.49  However, two interesting patterns emerge from both my 
(primary and secondary) datasets. First, using preferences, ethics and mandates as measures 
to gauge appropriate behaviour leads to comparable findings in terms of SNEs’ identification.  
Hence, one could view these three as tapping into one underlying dimension (i.e. ‘work 
identity’).50   Second, while at the level of loyalties territorial elements appear to play a 
(weakly) dominant role relative to epistemic and departmental issues, the reverse is true at the 
                                                 
49  Interestingly, according to all but one SNEs in my sample (i.e. 92 percent), they have no problems to 
navigate both their private opinions on European Union and the affiliational ambiguity characterising their 
secondment, and clearly state “While with the Commission, I work for the Commission” (Interview).  
50  For this reason, I will also analyse them jointly in the remainder of the analysis. 
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level of mandates, preferences and ethics (or ‘work identity’).  Hence, it appears that the 
‘epistemic’ role and perception of oneself is more salient in behavioural action while the 
(supra)national role often becomes more prominent when it concerns individuals’ loyalties.  
 
One potential explanation for this divergence could lie in SNEs’ (ambiguous) dual 
embeddedness and the (partial) difference between the organisational structure of 
Commission and national governments.  Indeed, the Commission is – just as national 
governments – built (chiefly) along principles of purpose and process (cf. Gulick, 1937).  
Hence, the formal structure of the Commission along these dimensions is highly compatible 
to that of the domestic institutions.  This could imply that the epistemic and departmental 
behavioural roles guiding SNEs’ behaviour remain largely unchallenged across these levels of 
governance. Hence, in terms of their work identity, they stay who they are (after all, they were 
hired as ‘experts’ on specific public policy issues). However, where both structures do differ 
is in the presence of the principle of territoriality, which is discernable only in the 
Commission.  While this does not affect SNEs’ ‘work identity’ – as experts in a given policy 
area – it can open for tensions along the territorial axis.  From an agent-driven perspective (cf. 
Goffman, 1959, 1982), this could lead to SNEs’ realignment to such ‘frames’ as have 
centrality and salience within their closest organisational context (and, being all policy experts 
in give field, this can only be the territorial axis). 
 
 
 
4.2. Behaviour as Dialecticism of Role-Play and Social Influence 
“It takes more or less a year to know how the rules are, but  
then, if I go back, then people say: “Can you work for me?”  
(Interview) 
 
The previous section illustrated that SNEs’ decision-making behaviour is, indeed, under 
influence of both social mechanisms enclosed in my synthetic theoretical model. Social 
influence is a powerful incentive for national experts in the Commission. However, SNEs also 
enact Commission’s ‘appropriate’ roles (as independent experts, representatives of their 
respective units and DGs and as supranational agents).  These findings are in close 
correspondence with previous literature (e.g., Schimmelfennig, 2003, 2005; Trondal, 2006; 
Trondal et al., 2007).  Moreover, having illustrated the presence of both mechanisms, it is 
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clear that traditional, uni-theoretical accounts of behavioural adaptation exclude important 
elements lying outside their chosen framework.  Thus, they, by definition, constrain scholars 
to use what Zürn and Checkel (2005: 1072) call an “underspecified theoretical apparatus”.   
 
This thesis proposes to redress this problem by providing a synthetic theoretical approach 
specifying the relation between both logics of action as dialectic – i.e. both mechanisms 
mutually interact and their combined effects shape SNEs’ behaviour (see Chapter Two).  The 
remainder of this chapter is dedicated to the empirical illustration of the hypothesised 
dialecticism. SNEs’ actual behaviour in the Commission will, under my model, ultimately, be 
both strategic and appropriate and – in similar spirit to Hoffman’s tenet of institutional 
continua (cf. supra) – be positioned along a continuum between “structural entrepreneur” and 
“structural idiot” (Checkel, 2003b: 11). As more extensively discussed in the theoretical 
Chapter Two, the relative strength of each mechanism varies depending on a number of scope 
conditions: Organisational design features, Domestic variables and Exposure effects. In the 
following six subsections, each scope condition will be briefly discussed, before the resulting 
hypothesis is confronted with the data.   
 
Before I turn to the analysis itself, a few brief notes on the methodology and the scope of the 
analysis are required.  Ultimately, I need to establish whether or not SNEs specific to a given 
scope condition (e.g., those autonomous from domestic institutions) differ in the importance 
they give to career and contacts relative to the Commission’s behavioural role expectations 
from those that do not meet the criteria stipulated under that same scope condition.  This 
would illustrate that both social mechanisms are at work, and differ in their relative strength 
under those respective conditions.  Nonetheless, as this information is not directly observable, 
I am compelled to evaluate whether certain ‘types’ of SNEs (described by the scope 
conditions analysed) are, for example, more or less likely to state that their secondment is an 
important step in their career, or for building (inter)national contacts (i.e. strategic optimising 
of ‘appropriate’ behaviour). When/if these answers are indicative of actual behaviour (and the 
strength of the underlying perceptions), this will allow me to illustrate my six calibrated 
hypotheses.51
                                                 
51  Note also that we dichotomise our central variables.  That is, either an SNE cares about his/her career and 
contacts, or not.  The same holds for the conditions stipulated under our main scope conditions.  For 
example, either an SNE is autonomous from his domestic organisation, or not (more details on how these 
variables are operationalised is given when discussing the respective hypotheses).  This obviously leads to 
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Two final comments are required.  First, given the limited size of the primary dataset, I merge 
both my primary and secondary data sources.  Despite the potential problems it entails due to 
the slightly different research question addressed in the secondary dataset (cf. supra), this 
allows me to analyse twice as many SNEs (twenty-six rather than thirteen).  Even so, the 
results from the analysis below cannot be seen as validating or refuting the theoretical model 
presented.  Instead, they should be seen as i) illustrative of the basic methodological set-up 
required to test the model and ii) give some preliminary indications as to its performance.  
Second, it is important to repeat here that the Commission is – just as national governments – 
built along principles of purpose and process (cf. Gulick, 1937).  As a result, the epistemic 
and departmental roles are largely ‘comparable’ across both institutions and not likely to be 
overly challenged when an SNE enters the Commission. This, however, is not the case for the 
territorial principle, which is only present in the Commission.  Realignment of loyalties thus 
is most likely to take place on the territorial dimension (or can be expected to be most salient 
there). 
 
4.2.1. Compatibility of structures 
Different organisations can have different structures and hence also different behavioural role 
expectations.  Following the literature, any structure-driven (re)socialisation is likely to 
depend on structures being adequately incompatible (Egeberg, 2001, 2004).  Hence, I 
hypothesised that: 
SH1: Increased incompatibility of Commission and SNEs’ domestic organisational structures 
strengthens effects of Commission’s behavioural role expectations upon SNE decision-making 
behaviour relative to strategic calculations of social influence, derived from that behaviour – 
and vice versa. 
 
I thereby operationalise (in)compatibility of Commission and domestic institutions via the 
SNE’s perception whether or not it took a long time to adjust to Commission way of working.  
When the SNE perceived such a ‘clash of cultures’, the domestic and Commission institutions 
are considered to be incompatible, and vice versa.  Note that the analysis thus is based on the 
perceptions of the SNEs, rather than a factual analysis of the structures themselves. The 
results of this analysis using loyalty to measure ‘appropriate’ behaviour are summarized in 
                                                                                                                                                        
rudimentary measures – with associated inferential problems – but the limited size of the dataset does not 
allow me to look in more detail at the variation in the variables used to assess the model. 
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Column (2) of Table 2 in Appendix Four.  The results when using ‘work identity’ are given in 
Column (2) of Table 3 in Appendix Five. 
 
Starting in the bottom row of Column (2) in Table 2 (Table 3 has the same structure, and 
should thus be read similarly to Table 2), it can be seen that there are seventeen SNEs in the 
sample that perceived Commission structures as incompatible with their domestic institutions, 
and six that viewed both structures as compatible (no information was available for the 
remaining three SNEs).  All other rows in Table 2 display how many SNEs in each of these 
two groups agree to the importance of both social influence proxies (i.e. the top two rows) and 
how many SNEs in each group feel a loyalty to each of the four behavioural roles (i.e. the 
next four rows) (clearly, in Table 3, these four rows display the number of SNEs whose 
preferences, mandate and ethics are linked to a given role).  To clarify the reading of the table, 
I offer two examples.  The “17 / 6” marked in the top row of Column (2) in Table 2 illustrates 
that all seventeen SNEs viewing the structures of Commission and domestic institutions as 
compatible (termed ‘compatible’ SNEs hereafter) as well as all six SNEs who viewed 
Commission and domestic structures as incompatible (termed ‘incompatible’ SNEs hereafter) 
agree that career motivations are very important for their stay as SNE in the Commission.  
The “12 / 4” in the second row implies that twelve ‘compatible’ and four ‘incompatible’ SNEs 
deem the construction of a contact network an asset of their secondment.  The remaining rows 
in both tables have a similar interpretation for the four behavioural roles (i.e. where SNEs’ 
loyalties or work identities lie, respectively, in Tables 2 and 3). 
 
The results indicate that all SNEs testify to strong career motivations, while ‘compatible’ 
SNEs are only marginally less likely to attach high importance to building a network (four out 
of 6, or two thirds, versus twelve out of 17, i.e. 71 percent).  In terms of loyalties, Table 2 
illustrates that ‘incompatible’ SNEs are slightly more likely to have epistemic (four out of 17, 
or 24 percent, versus one out of 6, i.e. 17 percent for ‘compatible’ SNEs) and national (six out 
of 17, i.e. 35 percent, versus one out of 6, i.e. 17 percent, for ‘compatible’ SNEs) loyalties, 
while no differences occur for supranational and departmental loyalties.  In terms of ‘work 
identification’, Table 3 likewise indicates few and, at best, marginal differences between both 
‘types’ of SNEs, although ‘incompatible’ SNEs are marginally more likely to have a 
supranational work identification than ‘compatible’ ones (four out of 17, i.e. 24 percent, 
versus one out of 6, i.e.17 percent). 
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Given the near-marginal size of the differences (and the small sample size of one of the 
categories), I therefore cannot confirm that perceived compatibility of structures is a scope 
condition driving the relative strength of strategic optimising and role-playing.  It might 
clearly be argued that this non-finding may (partially) derive from relying on SNEs’ 
perceptions regarding the structural compatibility, rather than the factual analysis of those 
structures. 
 
4.2.2. Organisational recency (SNE autonomy from domestic institutions) 
Organisation theory holds that current primary structures generate replacement of previous 
roles of behaviour (Egeberg, 1994, 2004; Trondal, 1999). Still, due to SNEs affiliational 
ambiguity, the clear temporal separation of primary and secondary affiliation required to 
produce such effects is absent.  Still, one might argue that this separation is clearer the more 
autonomous (or separated) SNEs’ are from their home administration.  Hence, I hypothesised 
that: 
SH2:  Greater autonomy of SNEs from their domestic organisation strengthens effects of 
Commission’s behavioural role expectations upon their decision-making behaviour relative to 
strategic calculations of social influence, derived from that behaviour – and vice versa.   
 
I measure autonomy by asking whether or not SNEs have frequent contacts with their home 
institution (as indicated by the SNEs themselves during the interviews). The results are 
summarized in Column (3) of Table 2 in Appendix Four (when using loyalty) and Column (3) 
of Table 3 in Appendix Five (when using ‘work identity’). 
 
I first of all find that both ‘types’ of SNEs (i.e. autonomous and connected) confirm strong 
career motivations, and are almost equally likely to attach high importance to building a 
network (eleven out of 17; 65 percent, versus six out of 9, i.e. two thirds).  However, unlike 
the previous analysis of structural compatibility, stronger differences now do occur when I 
shift attention to role-playing rather than strategic optimising of social influence.  Indeed, in 
terms of loyalties, Table 2 illustrates that ‘autonomous’ SNEs are much more likely to have 
supranational loyalties (eleven out of 17; 65 percent, versus two out of 9; 22 percent for 
‘connected’ SNEs) and much less likely to have national loyalties (three out of 17; 18 percent, 
versus four out of 9; 44 percent, for ‘connected’ SNEs).  Also, ‘connected’ SNEs are almost 
three times as likely to have epistemic loyalty compared to ‘autonomous’ SNEs (one third 
versus 12 percent), while they are slightly less likely to have a departmental loyalty (11 
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percent versus 18 percent).  The latter finding is confirmed when measuring appropriate SNE 
behaviour via their professed ‘work identities’ in Table 3.  Indeed, seven out of 17 
‘autonomous’ SNEs (i.e. 41 percent) claim to have an epistemic work identity, whereas this is 
the case for two-thirds (i.e. six out of 9) of the ‘connected’ SNEs. The order is reversed when 
looking at departmental work identities: two out of 9 ‘connected’ SNEs (or 22 percent) versus 
nine out of 17 (or 53 percent) ‘autonomous’ SNEs.  No effect is in Table 3 observed along the 
territorial axis. 
 
These results are broadly in line with SH2.  The more autonomous SNEs are from their 
domestic institutions (i.e. the fewer contacts they have with the domestic organisation), the 
more likely it is that they realign along the territorial axis. The Commission’s role 
expectations concerning SNEs’ decision-making behaviour along the territorial dimension 
thus appear to weigh stronger for ‘autonomous’ SNEs, compared to ‘connected’ SNEs.  
Despite this difference, both groups are calculating since career and contacts are deemed 
crucially important by both.  Hence, the relative importance of role-play and strategic 
optimising of social influence appears to differ across both groups.  Compared to ‘connected’ 
SNEs, ‘autonomous’ SNEs are closer to the ‘role-playing’ end of the hypothesised continuum 
between both mechanisms (consistent with SH2). 
 
4.2.3. Education 
Education is often regarded as people’s first and most intense period of socialisation 
(Johnston, 2005; Zürn and Checkel, 2005). Hence, the nature and institution(s) of SNEs’ 
education can be thought to provide with them the tools instrumental either for socialisation 
into, or strategic evaluation of, Commission’s behavioural role expectations. As it is crucial 
whether or not the education ‘moulds’ SNEs in line with European – or Commission – 
identities, roles and loyalties, or national ones, I hypothesised: 
SH3: More ‘Europeanised’ education of SNEs strengthens effects of Commission’s 
behavioural role expectations upon their decision-making behaviour relative to strategic 
calculations of social influence, derived from that behaviour – and vice versa for more 
‘national’ education of SNEs. 
 
I measure ‘national’ versus ‘European’ education as a simple dichotomous variable.  It is set 
equal to ‘national’ when the SNE did not have any education abroad, while it is ‘European’ 
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when the SNE had at least part of his/her education abroad.52  The results are summarized in 
Column (4) of Table 2 in Appendix Four (when relying on ‘loyalty’) and Column (4) of Table 
3 in Appendix Five (when using ‘work identity’).  Note that my secondary dataset was very 
sparse in terms of the information concerning respondents’ education.  As it could often not 
be established what and where respondents have studied, the number of observations here is 
significantly smaller than in the remaining analyses. 
 
Looking at strategic behaviour first, it can be seen that the results are somewhat mixed.  
While slightly more ‘European’-educated SNEs care about the benefits of secondment for 
their career (compared to ‘national’-educated ones), the reverse appears to hold for the 
importance attached to building up contact networks while in the Commission.  Interestingly, 
however, we once again observe noticeable differences when analysing SNEs loyalties in the 
bottom part of Table 2.  That is, ‘European’-educated SNEs are much more likely to have 
supranational loyalties (two-thirds, or 6 out of 9, versus one third, or 3 out of 9, for ‘national’-
educated SNEs) and much less likely to have national loyalties (one out of 9, or 11 percent, 
versus three out of 9, i.e. one third, for ‘national’-educated SNEs).  Epistemic and 
departmental loyalties are both more also likely for ‘European’-educated SNEs.  Table 3 
shows that there are no observable differences between both ‘types’ of SNEs regarding their 
work identification.  
 
Overall, it appears that the more ‘European’ SNEs’ education, the stronger the Commission’s 
role expectations concerning SNEs’ supranational roles weigh – and the more likely it is that 
realignment along the territorial axis takes place.  Still, as before, both European-educated and 
national-educated SNEs are strongly calculating in their behaviour (i.e. career and contacts 
remain crucially important to both groups).  This suggests that the relative importance of role-
playing and strategic optimising differs depending on where SNEs had their education.  
Compared to ‘national’-educated SNEs, ‘European’-educated SNEs are closer to the ‘role-
playing’ end of the hypothesised continuum between both mechanisms. The basic direction of 
these results thus is supportive of hypothesis SH3.   
 
                                                 
52  One of my Dutch SNEs was of Irish origin and moved to the Netherlands after his secondary education.  
Hence, as his higher education was in the Netherlands, he is categorised as ‘European’ education. 
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4.2.4. Chronological primacy 
Longer full and continuous affiliation to institutional structures makes the related behavioural 
role expectations ‘stickier’ and more difficult to ‘dislodge’ and affect re-socialisation 
(Egeberg, 2004).  Undoing and/or eclipsing pre-socialisation effects of previous primary 
structures (i.e. first in chronological time) thus requires consistency over time of the effects of 
current primary structures (i.e. second in chronological time). In effect, the relative length of 
embeddedness within both structures is a crucial factor (Egeberg, 2004). Consequently, I 
hypothesised that: 
SH4: Longer previous embeddedness of SNEs in their domestic organisation weakens effects 
of Commission’s behavioural role expectations upon their decision-making behaviour relative 
to strategic calculations of social influence, derived from that behaviour – and vice versa. 
 
Since the secondment contracts to the Commission are at most four years long (cf. supra), I 
define this period of time as the cut-off between SNEs with strong and weak previous 
embeddedness.  That is, SNEs are deemed to have a strong prior primary (i.e. domestic) 
embeddedness when they have held the post in their domestic institution for at least four 
consecutive years, while those with strictly shorter domestic affiliations are deemed to have a 
weak(er) prior primary embeddedness.  The results are summarized in Column (5) of Table 2 
in Appendix Four (when relying on loyalty) and Column (5) of Table 3 in Appendix Five 
(when using ‘work identity’).  
 
It can first of all be observed that SNEs with more than four years of previous embeddedness 
(‘previously embedded’ SNEs henceforth) are more forceful in stating the importance of 
secondment for their future career and contact network.  More specifically, all thirteen 
‘previously embedded’ SNEs care about secondment as a career move (versus eight out of 10, 
or 80 percent, of ‘non-embedded’ SNEs) and nine regard the development of contact 
networks as crucial (i.e. 69 percent, versus 6 out of 10, or 60 percent, of ‘non-embedded’ 
SNEs). With regard to their loyalties, ‘previously embedded’ SNEs seem to align themselves 
more on the territorial axis than ‘non-embedded’ SNEs.  Specifically, eight and four 
‘previously embedded’ SNEs (i.e. 62 percent and 31 percent respectively) identify themselves 
as having a supranational or national loyalty, while the corresponding numbers of ‘non-
embedded’ SNEs are four and two respectively (i.e. 40 percent and 20 percent).  Moving to 
Table 3, the reverse appears to hold when analysing SNEs’ work identity.  In this case, 
‘previously embedded’ SNEs mostly profess an epistemic or departmental identity, and only 
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one asserts a supranational work identity.  In comparison, four out of ten ‘non-embedded’ 
SNEs claim to have a supranational work identity.  Also, in both tables, it is obvious that 
‘non-embedded’ SNEs are much more evenly distributed across work identities and loyalties 
than ‘previously embedded’ SNEs. 
 
These findings are intuitively logical when one considers that both the Commission and 
national governments are primarily built along principles of purpose and process. Hence, 
SNEs with a long history in their domestic administration easily find their way and, in terms 
of their work identity, stay who they are (i.e. experts in a given policy field).  SNEs lacking 
such previous experience face more unfamiliar constraints and are less likely to have a clearly 
shaped work identity as yet.  However, the principle of territoriality is specific to the 
Commission.  As a consequence, ‘previously embedded’ SNEs are likely to face tension only 
along this axis. Given their strongly established work identity as experts within a specific 
public policy field, realignment can thus only take place for loyalties, and along the territorial 
axis.   
 
In conclusion, the territorial axis (both supranational and national loyalty) appears to more 
strongly influence ‘previously embedded’ SNEs compared to ‘non-embedded’ SNEs.  
However, given that the results also show that they are more likely to care about strategic 
incentives related to secondment, this may indicate that they are strategically using their 
awareness of the saliency of the territorial factor in the way they think best serves their 
purpose.  In that sense, it is enlightening to see that half of the ‘previously embedded’ SNEs 
with a supranational loyalty had ‘European’ education while a quarter had a ‘national’ 
education; half of the ‘previously embedded’ SNEs with a national loyalty had ‘national’ 
education while only a quarter had a ‘European’ education.53 Assuming that education 
discloses information on SNEs’ ‘aim in life’, this further corroborates with the fact that 
‘previously embedded’ SNEs appear to be more actively engaging in “impression 
management” (cf. Goffman, 1959, see also Schimmelfennig, 2002) – in line with SH4.   
 
4.2.5. Intensity of contacts with Commission co-workers 
Given the limited time of secondment, intensity of interaction with one’s closest colleagues is 
likely to be more important than length of contact for potential structural effects upon SNEs’ 
                                                 
53  No information concerning the education of the other SNEs in this group is available. 
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loyalties, identities and decision-making behaviour. Only if SNEs are sufficiently immersed in 
the Commission’s organisational life are its role expectations likely to maximise their effects 
upon SNEs’ behaviour and curtail SNEs’ strategic optimising of them. Consequently, I 
hypothesised that: 
SH5: Less intense contacts of SNEs with Commission co-workers weakens effects of 
Commission’s behavioural role expectations upon their decision-making behaviour relative to 
strategic calculations of social influence, derived from that behaviour – and vice versa. 
 
The intensity of contacts between SNEs and Commission’s permanent staff is measured by 
the extent to which the SNE feels isolated, lonely and/or ‘on the side-lines’ while working in 
the Commission.  More precisely, I dichotomise the perception of contacts into SNEs with 
contacts and SNEs feeling lonely.  The results are brought together in Column (6) of Table 2 
in Appendix Four (when relying on ‘loyalty’ to measure SNE appropriate behaviour) and 
Column (6) of Table 3 in Appendix Five (when using ‘work identity’). 
 
Opening the discussion of the findings, as before, with the importance attached to career and 
contact networks, there is very little difference between both groups of SNEs.  For both 
‘types’, nearly all SNEs state that the potential of career improvement and the development of 
a contact network are crucially important parts of their time in the Commission.  In general, 
the same observation can be made regarding the loyalties and work identities that are 
expressed in both groups of SNEs.  The differences between SNEs with and without intense 
contact to Commission co-workers are, at best, marginal.  I therefore cannot confirm that 
intensity of contact is a scope condition driving the relative strength of strategic optimising 
and role-playing.  However, similarly with the compatibility of structures condition (cf. 
Section 4.2.1), one possible explanation might be the reliance on SNEs’ (subjective) 
perceptions of the intensity of their contacts, rather than their actual contacts. 
 
4.2.6. Noviceness 
The sixth and final scope condition identified in my theoretical model is noviceness. Being 
new in a given setting implies one has no ‘relevance criteria’ to draw upon (Johnston, 2005), 
which can increase susceptibility to effects of ‘the’ behavioural role expectations while 
lowering awareness of social influence (accruable from such behaviour). Hence, I 
hypothesised that: 
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SH6: Noviceness of SNEs strengthens effects of Commission’s behavioural role expectations 
upon their decision-making behaviour relative to strategic calculations of social influence, 
derived from that behaviour – and vice versa. 
 
I take into account two criteria to determine SNEs’ noviceness.  First, SNEs are considered 
novices when they arrive in the Commission without (or very little) public administration 
experience.  Second, they are considered novices when they are young (cf. Hooghe, 2005) 
(i.e. under 30 years of age). My empirical data include information from nine SNEs who fit at 
least one of those characteristics.  The results are given in Column (7) of Table 2 in Appendix 
Four (when relying on ‘loyalty’) and Column (7) of Table 3 in Appendix Five (when using 
‘work identity’). 
 
Examining the top two columns of Tables 2 and 3, it can be seen that SNEs are almost equally 
likely to see secondment as crucial for their future careers.  A stronger divergence, however, 
occurs when we look at the importance attached to contact networks.  ‘Novices’ are almost 
twice as likely to highly value such contact networks than those that arrive to the Commission 
with (extensive) public administration experience (‘old hands’ henceforth) (seven out of 9, i.e. 
78 percent, versus seven out of 15, or 47 percent).  This difference may, however, reflect that 
a significant share of ‘novices’ in the sample is young “fast-trackers”.  These are, almost by 
definition, highly career-minded and still very eager to develop a contact-network to further 
their later career.   
 
Turning to the bottom half of Table 2, most ‘novices’ identify themselves by their epistemic 
(five out of nine, or 56 percent) or supranational loyalty (three out of nine, or one third).  Very 
few of them profess national or departmental loyalties.  For ‘old hands’, the picture is very 
different.  Very few of these admit to an epistemic or departmental loyalty, but rather seem to 
align themselves along the territorial axis (with 60 percent and 40 percent stating a 
supranational or national loyalty respectively).  Turning to Table 3, it transpires that, much 
like in the case of chronological primacy (cf. section 4.2.4.), the reverse appears to hold when 
analysing SNEs’ work identity.  In fact, most ‘old hands’ (i.e. two thirds) now argue to have a 
departmental work identification.  On the other hand, most ‘novices’ have both a loyalty and 
work identity that is epistemic (56 percent in both cases).  Given that these ‘novices’ mostly 
come from either the private sector and/or are ‘up-and-coming’ civil servants, such affiliation 
with their professional expertise seems reasonable. 
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How do these results tie in with my dialectic theoretical model?  A similar argument than that 
in the case of chronological primacy can be thought of.  ‘Novices’ are more likely to be a 
‘tabula rasa’ (Inayatullah and Blaney, 1996; Trondal, 1999) when they come into the 
Commission.  As such, they may be extremely aware of the importance to their future career 
of being perceived as an expert.  Given that their professional reputation then is of very great 
value to them, it is through that identity that they can gain access to ‘useful contacts’ and 
legitimise their future career demands. Consequently, they align themselves to those ‘frames’ 
as have centrality and salience for them within their closest organisational context: i.e. that of 
an expert.  They thence strategically use the expert role to best serve their purpose.  As a 
consequence, rather than ‘old hands’ (as hypothesised under SH6), it appears to be the 
‘novices’ in my sample that are more concerned with and active in “impression management” 
(cf. Goffman, 1959, see also Schimmelfennig, 2002).  This, interestingly, ties in closely with 
Hooghe (2005: 871), who argues that (strategic) optimising behaviour “is most likely to trump 
socialization when an individual’s career chances are at stake”. 
 
 
 
4.3. Conclusion 
Upon reviewing the empirical findings of my analysis, a first conclusion that can be drawn is 
that SNEs’ decision-making behaviour is under influence of both social mechanisms enclosed 
in my synthetic theoretical model.  On the one hand, career and contact networks are deemed 
to be crucially important by a large majority of SNEs in both the primary and secondary 
sample – such that social influence should certainly be seen as a powerful incentive for 
national experts seconded to the Commission. On the other hand, Commission’s behavioural 
role expectations (at the epistemic, departmental and territorial level) also matter – with the 
most salient roles of behaviour being those of an expert, representative of the unit/DG 
(departmental) and supranational civil servant. This clear presence of both social mechanisms 
in SNEs’ behaviour strongly suggests that traditional, uni-theoretical accounts of behavioural 
adaptation are – at least when analysing SNEs in the European Commission (though most 
likely also more generally) – incomplete.   
 
A second conclusion deriving from the analysis is that – despite the small sample size – there 
are indications of SNEs’ behaviour in the Commission being both strategic and appropriate.  
It thus appears to be positioned along a continuum between ‘structural idiocy’ and ‘structural 
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entrepreneurism’, as brought forward by my theoretical model.  Indeed, the relative strength 
of social influence versus Commission’s behavioural role expectations on SNEs behaviour 
seems to vary depending on certain ‘scope conditions’. Particularly, it is SNEs’ education, 
autonomy from domestic organisations, prior embeddedness and noviceness that appear 
important in this respect.  Incompatibility of Commission and domestic structures and 
intensity of contacts with Commission co-workers appear to have little or not influence. 
 
Interestingly, the results are generally somewhat stronger for the ‘objective’ scope conditions 
in my model (e.g., SNE education, noviceness or chronological primacy) compared to the 
more ‘subjective’ ones (e.g., intensity of contact, compatibility of structures or autonomy 
from domestic institutions).  One possible explanation for this trend in my findings might be 
that the scope conditions based on subjective perceptions of the SNEs involve a ‘double’ 
interpretation process. Not only do SNEs themselves interpret the central variable in the scope 
condition (e.g., intensity of their contacts), but I also interpret their interpretation.54  This 
might induce too much ‘measurement error’ to allow for clear-cut results (especially in a 
sample as small as mine).  As a result, future researchers should aim to minimize such bias by 
defining their scope conditions in the most objective way possible (this also avoids 
unwarranted variability across studies which is simply due to alternative understandings of the 
same topic). 
 
Clearly, there are a number of caveats related to the limited size of the sample, dichotomous 
nature of the variables in the empirical analysis and so on (which have been mentioned 
repeatedly throughout).  Hence, despite the (limited) supportive findings, further 
corroboration of these empirical results is obviously required to ascertain the validity of the 
dialectic theoretical model proposed in my thesis.   
 
Finally, it should be mentioned that some SNEs admitted to have been briefed – albeit 
informally – about life during and after secondment to the Commission prior to their own 
stay.  That is, while the majority of my (primary) respondents admitted not having received 
any official briefing, one third nonetheless answered that they talked to colleagues who had 
been SNEs before. As one British SNEs says: “No, I didn’t need any briefing. But when I 
                                                 
54  Additionally, even though all respondents in my primary sample spoke very proficient English, there may 
obviously be a linguistic filter at playas respondents during the interviews had to navigate two languages: 
their own and English.  While respondents are used to this from their daily work, such language filter should 
nonetheless be taken into a consideration. 
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arrived here, a couple of really, really cynical SNEs kind of gave me the load down; it framed 
the perspective, and it kind of set the parameters within which I went through my time here.” 
A Norwegian SNE explained: “My home administration, they had an SNE here in 2003 – and 
I talked to him, and in a way he gave me some warnings on how things work, because how 
they [i.e. the Commission] plan work is not as they do at home.” Two further respondents 
mentioned that they have partners who were SNEs during the time of their own application, 
and that they “talked about it at home when this opportunity came up” (Interview). Within my 
secondary data, two SNEs had discussed their secondments with previous SNE colleagues, 
while one is married to a (then) currently seconded expert.  Such ‘informal briefings’ are also 
mentioned in my textual sources (Trondal et al., 2007). 
 
The presented finding is of significant importance, since it attests to the fact that an informal 
briefing has been had by one third of the SNEs in my overall sample. Not only does this 
indicate that those SNEs knew beforehand what are the Commission’s ‘behavioural 
expectancies’, but it also suggests that, thereby, they were able to perform an optimising 
calculation of those roles’  ’worth’. Consequently, one can therefore argue that these SNEs’ 
have shown an intent to purposefully adapt to such roles as are ‘appropriate’ within the 
Commission and thereby performed an act of strategic calculation of ‘logic of 
appropriateness’ (Johnston, 2005).  Ultimately, such ‘preparation’ for secondment can, 
arguably, question the overall validity of ‘influencing effects of structural roles’ argument. It 
would be interesting – and crucial – in future research to assess how this pre-secondment 
(informal) ‘briefing’ affects the results of SNE socialisation studies.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
CONCLUSION, DISCUSSION 
AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
As argued throughout my thesis, previous integration and socialisation research provides a 
uni-dimensional view of behavioural adaptation, since it does not take into account the 
sociological and psychological insights stressing the importance of ‘self-socialization’ within 
such a process.  In contrast, my thesis attempts to develop a more holistic understanding, 
based on the dialectics of structure and agency, thus placing actors’ actual behaviour on a 
continuum between strategic optimising and structural socialisation. As stated in section 1.3, 
my thesis specified three main goals: i) to design a dynamic model of behaviour adoption 
based on dialectics of structure and agency, ii) to analytically operationalise this model using 
two institutionalist theories via ‘both/and’ analytical logic, based on the use of social 
mechanisms and scope conditions, and iii) to offer an empirical illustration of this dialectic 
model.  I hereby claim that my thesis achieved all these three aims. 
 
Specifically, in my model I conceptualise adoption of appropriate behaviour as being moulded 
by two different, but mutually interacting effects: strategic optimising and behavioural role 
expectations. Secondly, by combining rational choice institutionalism (RCI) – partially 
incorporating Erving Goffman’s theory of dramaturgic action – and organisation theory 
through a ‘both/and’ approach, I have gained a theoretical anchoring for operationalising the 
model.  The latter is then achieved by identifying two specific mechanisms of social influence 
and role-playing, and whose domain of application was delineated by the following scope 
conditions: compatibility of structures, organisational recency, education, chronological 
primacy, intensity of contacts and noviceness. Last, but not least, by presenting an analysis of 
SNEs’ behavioural adaptation during their secondment in the Commission, I have offered an 
empirical illustration for that model, and thereby achieved also the third aim of my thesis. 
 
My empirical analysis clearly illustrates both mechanisms of strategic optimising and role-
playing being simultaneously at play in SNEs’ adoption of Commission ‘appropriate’ 
behaviour.  To conclusively ascertain the dialecticism of their relationship would require an 
extensive statistical dataset, not in my possession.  Nonetheless, the limited data that were 
available to me, offer a suggestive indication of such tendencies, in line with my main 
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predictions.  Specifically, I do find several indications that the relative strength of behavioural 
role expectations and strategic calculations of social influence (upon SNE decision-making 
behaviour) varies under different conditions.  More specifically, it indicates that SNEs with 
longer previous embeddedness in their domestic organisation, with European education and 
who are more autonomous from their home institution appear to be strategically using their 
awareness of the territorial dimension in the Commission in a way they think best serves their 
purpose.  Somewhat surprisingly, the same holds for ‘novices’ (while at odds with the specific 
hypothesis brought forward on this scope condition, it nonetheless supports the dialectic 
dynamics of the model). No such effects, however, were found when analysing the scope 
conditions of intensity of contact and compatibility of structures. One possible explanation 
comes to mind: these scope conditions were operationalised through SNEs’ perceptions 
regarding their contacts and the compatibility of Commission-domestic structures, rather than 
their factual analysis. This, however, might have induced unwarranted measurement error. 
 
The analysis presented in this thesis is, both at the theoretical and empirical level, open to a 
number of extensions. From a theoretical point of view, it is obviously limiting to focus only 
on strategic optimising and cognitive role-playing.  While delineating the scope of an analysis 
is obviously advisable, it nonetheless implies disregarding certain potentially relevant 
elements (note that this was one of the central reasons for attempting to build my thesis’ 
model in the first place).  Specifically, I account neither for the role of persuasion (i.e. 
Checkel’s Type II internalisation), nor for the role of mimicking55 Hence, one further step in 
developing the theoretical model would be to attempt an incorporation of these additional 
elements.  While their inclusion is likely to significantly complicate the analysis at both 
theoretical (e.g., incorporating persuasion would imply adding socio-constructivism) and 
empirical level (e.g., it would vastly increase the demands placed on the empirical dataset 
needed to test it), it also opens the door to (potentially) fruitful additional insights.  For one, 
the order of persuasion, role-playing, mimicking and strategic action (in a sequential or 
simultaneous order) within the process can be more extensively analysed (Johnston, 2005).  
Also, it can facilitate understanding of which socialisation mechanisms should be considered 
primary and which secondary – thus leading to possible insights concerning causal chains 
                                                 
55  Mimicking differs from rational, strategic adaptation in the sense that there is no means-end calculation 
involved (in fact, the ‘end’ itself would be uncertain as it occurs when one has not yet an idea of what 
(social) rewards might be reaped) (Johnston, 2005).  On the other hand, it is obviously closely related to 
Checkel’s (2005) notion of cognitive role-playing – except that it is not (solely) driven by institutional 
structures.  
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(Elster, 1989; Hedström and Sveberg, 1998; Martin and Simmons, 1998; Maier and Risse, 
2003; Zürn and Checkel, 2005). 
 
From an empirical point of view, it is first of all crucial to repeat that the current analysis was 
significantly curtailed by data constraints.  Hence, as mentioned, a first important step would 
be to further assess the validity of dialecticism, defining the theoretical model proposed in my 
thesis.  However, besides this methodological point, I firmly believe that the type of data 
employed in the present analysis allows for additional interesting applications.  Indeed, 
research on SNEs has been close to non-existent in the literature to date.  Nevertheless, 
compiling data on SNEs provides an opportunity to compare SNEs and permanent 
administrators (of a given institution).  This would bring further contributions towards – and 
better empirical testing of – affiliational importance in the processes of (micro) integration 
and socialisation.  Moreover, SNE-analysis is likely to be fruitful in mapping the (potential) 
evolution of organisational and normative structures within the home institution itself after the 
seconded staff members return from their international postings.  Does the (potential) 
supranational socialisation of these civil servants’ ‘rub off’ on the institution, or is it simply 
‘disregarded’? If so, how?56  Third, given the often important role of (home-institution’s) pre-
socialisation (cf. Hooghe, 2005), it would be interesting to consider the SNE-recruitment 
process itself: i.e. what determines the choice to allow staff to take up SNE-positions, how do 
national institutions select their SNEs and how does all this affect the potential supranational 
(re)socialisation process. 
 
As a final point, I wish to briefly raise two vital topics that have thus far remained 
unmentioned in my thesis. First, no mention has been made of the normative issues involving 
supranational integration and socialisation.  This inattention to the normative implications of 
socialisation processes is not uncommon in the field of International Relations.  For example, 
none of the contributions to the Fall 2005 special issue of International Organization pays any 
attention to it (except the concluding contribution by Zürn and Checkel [2005], who lament its 
absence).  Clearly, however, supranational integration (and socialisation) introduces important 
questions of legitimacy and the relative roles and powers of national and supranational 
legislative bodies.  This issue plays especially strongly in the European Union as European 
                                                 
56  This links closely to Johnston’s (2005: 1029) suggestion to analyse the evolution of “the international 
institution itself (…) as an agent in the socialisation process of human actors”.  Still, rather than regard the 
evolution of the international institution’s organisational and normative structures, following SNEs over 
time would allow analysis of potential evolutions in national institutional structures. 
 72
institutions have the power to decide on certain topics even when their decision goes directly 
against the wishes and/or preferences of one (or more) of the member-states.  Despite this 
wide-ranging power, however, the “European Commission is not accountable to national 
communities, and election campaigns for the European Parliament focus (…) rarely on 
European questions” (Zürn and Checkel, 2005: 1073).  This forces the obvious question 
whether their decisions meet basic democratic standards.  While one possible answer is to 
argue that supranational institutions are only agents in a principal-agent relation with the 
nation-states and thereby derive indirect legitimacy (cf. Moravcsik, 2002; Kahler, 2004), Zürn 
and Checkel (2005: 1073) undermine this argument by stating that “socialisation effects blur 
the principal-agent distinction”, inducing “a significant accountability problem”.  Hence, 
while integration and socialisation are, in some aspects certainly desirable, “it is, normatively 
speaking, more ambiguous than it first seems” (Zürn and Checkel, 2005: 1048).  
 
This normative question clearly goes to the heart of the integrationalist and socialisation story.  
Moreover, it strongly occupies the minds of many national politicians.  For example, the 2003 
Norwegian and Danish ‘Power and Democracy’ studies, were independently commissioned 
by the Parliaments of both countries to investigate, amongst others, the “internationalisation 
of domestic politics” stemming from their integration into European (and international) 
political orders (NOU 2003: 19; Togeby, 2003).  Interestingly, the conclusions drawn were 
diverging. While both studies identified a high degree of ‘internationalisation’ in domestic 
legislative processes, the Norwegian study identified it as one of the major culprits of 
corrosion of (classic, representative) democracy in Norway. The Danish study, on the other 
hand, viewed it in more positive terms, namely as ‘empowering’ the individual citizen (NOU 
2003; Togeby, 2003).  Whether international integration and socialisation is – or can be – 
viewed as beneficial or detrimental to legitimacy and accountability thus appears to be – even 
when incorporating normative issues – ambiguous and somewhat dependent upon the level of 
analysis.  
  
Second, unlike in most other branches of political science, comparative research is not well 
established in IR (Johnston, 2005).  Most empirical work (including my own analysis here) 
concentrates on the EU (for an exception, see Acharya, 2004) for the simple reason that this is 
the most institutionalised international environment available and thus offers a best-case 
scenario to uncover socialisation.  While analysis of such a most-likely case provides a strong 
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case for falsification (King et al., 1994), the mixed findings in the ‘Europeanisation’ literature 
suggest that empirical extensions beyond Europe might prove fruitful.   
 
For one, Western-style institutions transposed into other regions with different cultures (e.g., 
ASEAN in Asia, MERCOSUR in Latin-America) may in themselves generate a ‘clash of 
cultures’.  Does supranational socialisation work similarly in such intercultural environments? 
How does it translate upon the domestic level (once again generating potential problems of 
legitimacy; cf. supra)?  But even at a more basic level, it will be interesting to ask how – 
given my hypothesised dialectics between structure and agency – institutions develop 
depending on different underlying cultures.  Are there any “systematic cross-regional 
differences” (Johnston, 2005: 1037) or do these “disappear if one looks at specific processes 
within institutions across regions” (Johnston, 2005: 1038)?  While such comparative research 
is likely to be riddled with difficulties of a practical nature (e.g., access to respondents, 
barriers of language and cultural, and so on), the benefits in terms of increased understanding 
of integration (and socialisation) processes in different settings (and under varying scope 
conditions) might offer ample compensation.  Consequently, I argue that further 
developments of theoretical, as well as methodological, apparatus should be flexible enough 
to allow steps towards a more comparative approach, currently absent from much of the 
integration and socialisation literature. 
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APPENDIX ONE 
 
Interview guide to Seconded National Experts at the EU-Commission 
 
Topic of interview:  
Socialisation within the Commission. 
 
Research questions:  
RQ: Can actor’s properties, roles and decision-making behaviour within an institution – 
rather than singularly shaped either by socialising effects of normative roles, or through 
his/her strategic evaluation of them – be better characterised as issuing from their 
dialecticism?     
 
Background: 
• What is your educational and professional background? 
• Did you study abroad or in you home country?  
• Is this your first posting as a seconded National expert? 
• Where, and what type of the position did you hold prior to your EU-posting, and what 
is your current one here at the Commission? Is there a big difference between them? 
• When, why and how were you recruited for the current SNE-posting to the 
Commission? 
• What were your reasons for becoming a SNE? 
• What was your opinion on the European Union (as a system, and as an idea) at the 
time of application? Why? Did it change during your posting? If so, why, and how? 
• How long have you worked: 
1. at your home institution/unit, prior to your posting? 
 85
2. in the current EU-position?  
 
Contact with home institution: 
• Did your institution brief you on your role and its goals prior to your posting in the 
Commission?  
• How often are you in contact with your home institution, what kind of contact is it and 
who initiates it? Are you satisfied with its frequency and forms, or do you wish for 
more? If so, what? 
 
General institutional questions: 
• How would you generally describe your daily work routine here? Re: degree of 
autonomy; work rules; workload? 
• Does the routine deviate from the one you had back at home? If so, to what extent, and 
how? Are your perceptions generally valid amongst other SNEs working in your 
DG/unit/division/portfolio, or you “stand alone” on that? 
• As a SNE, do you stand “apart”, or there is no difference between the position of 
SNEs and the “permanent” staff at you DG/unit/portfolio? If so, why? 
• Which contact(s) do you consider as the most important for you in your position as a 
SNE? Why? 
• With whom do you generally interact outside office? Colleagues in your DG/unit? 
Own nationals? Other nationals?    
 
Personal perceptions 
• What kind of identity do you believe your DG/unit/portfolio carries: epistemic, 
departmental, intergovernmental, or supranational (European)? 
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• Seconded National Experts posted to such international institutions as the EU 
might experience conflict of interests and loyalties. Where does your loyalty 
foremost lie (to your profession, portfolio, home country, European Union as a 
system and idea), and why? 
• Was it difficult to adjust your decision-making behaviour? Can you say why you 
adjusted? 
• Do you think that your institutional affiliation back home might have been 
instrumental in shaping your present loyalty? If so, how, to what extent, and why? 
• Is your loyalty stable, or does/did it shift? If so, when, and why?  
• How would you define yourself as a SNE, and your performance here:  
As someone who adopts a certain role (supranational, national, epistemic?), or a 
combination of them (if so: which?)? Why: conscious calculation, perception of 
appropriate behaviour, or combination of both?  
• Which of the affiliations – current and prior – do you regard as primary and which 
as secondary?  Why? 
• Do you have many professional contacts? 
• After your posting here is finished, do you expect to return back to your home 
institution?  
• Do you hope for promotion? 
• Can you see yourself using your Commission contacts?  
• Would you be interested to work again as a SNE? Why? 
• Is there anything else I should have asked you about? Is there anything else 
you would like to add? 
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APPENDIX TWO 
 
Initial Letter of Contact with Twenty-four SNEs, e-mailed on 05.03.07. 
 
 
To whom it might concern. 
 
From: Zuzana Murdoch 
          Berlin, Germany/Agder University College, Kristiansand, Norway 
          zuzanm04@student.hia.no
     05. March 2007 
  
Dear Sir/Madam, 
 
My name is Zuzana Murdoch and I am a student on Master course in Public Administration 
and Leadership (specialisation: European Integration) at the Agder University College in 
Kristiansand, Norway. 
 
I am currently writing my Master thesis, which deals with effects of Europeanisation at a 
micro-level, more specifically with how individual agents get socialised into European 
Union’s institutions. Since my research topic requires individuals having affiliations both at 
the national and supranational level, I have decided – together with my supervisor, Prof. Jarle 
Trondal – that the ideal data would be that gathered from Seconded National Experts, 
currently working at the European Commission. 
 
Since Prof. Trondal has already conducted a round of interviews at your institution on a 
similar topic in connection with the pan-European Connex project (in 2004/5), I would like to 
turn to you with a plea for co-operation. The extent of my thesis requires a data set from 
perhaps ten interviews of SNEs of different nationalities, and I would be extremely grateful 
should you find time – and will – to be interviewed. I am fully aware of your obligations and 
full schedules, but – due to the time constraints of my thesis, the interviews ought ideally be 
conducted within the time frame of weeks 13 (26. – 31.March), and 15 (09. – 14.April). 
However, within this time constrain, I am prepared to travel to Brussels whenever it might 
suit you.  
 
The interview will last app.45 min, will be conducted in English, and the questions asked deal 
with interviewee’s: 
• Professional and educational background 
• Contact with home institutions  
• General institutional questions 
• His/her personal perception on roles, identities and decision-making behaviour in the 
Commission 
• Short personal accounts on how and why this adaptation occurred, 
• What are their plans upon the conclusion of present secondment 
 
I would also like to add some concrete information regarding my interviewing technique: 
 88
• The interviews are semi-structured  (the interviewee speaks freely on above-
mentioned themes) and will be taped (if allowed, naturally). 
• To safeguard interviewees privacy, they will remain anonymous, gender-less, nor will 
they be identified by their DG-affiliation 
• The only identification:  by nationality and the length of secondment. 
 
I would be very grateful should you reply positively to my letter. 
 
To confirm your interest, and to arrange a date, please reply via e-mail.  
My e-address is: zuzanm04@student.hia.no
Should you require any further information, please do not hesitate and contact me: 
Either by (mobile) phone: on +47 90 67 66 07, or to the above-mentioned e-address. 
 
Should you require references, please contact my supervisor: 
Prof. Jarle Trondal  
Instittut for statsvitenskap og ledelsesfag 
Fakultet for økonomi og samfunnsfag 
Agder University College. 
His e-address: jarle.trondal@hia.no
 
Thank you very much. 
Yours truly. 
 
Zuzana Murdoch. 
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APPENDIX THREE 
 
Letter e-mailed to Twenty-five (25) permanent missions on 07. March 07. 
 
To whom it might concern. 
 
From: Zuzana Murdoch 
           Berlin/Kristiansand 
           zuzanm04@student.hia.no   
 07.03.2007 
 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
 
My name is Zuzana Murdoch and I am a student on Master course in Public Administration 
and Leadership (specialisation: European Integration) at the Agder University College in 
Kristiansand, Norway. 
 
I am currently writing my Master thesis, which deals with effects of Europeanisation at a 
micro-level, more specifically with how individual agents get socialised into European 
Union’s institutions. Since my research topic requires individuals having affiliations both at 
the national and supranational level, I have decided – together with my supervisor, Prof. Jarle 
Trondal – that the ideal data would be that gathered from Seconded National Experts, 
currently working at the European Commission. 
 
Therefore I would be very grateful should you help me to get in touch with your national 
experts, currently seconded to that institution. All I need is one, two names and their e-mail 
addresses, so that I could get in touch with them personally. The interviews will be conducted 
in English and will last app.45min. I shall travel to Brussels to conduct them. To guarantee the 
confidentiality clause, SNEs willing to participate will be identified solely by their nationality 
and length of their secondment; otherwise they will remain anonymous, gender-less and 
without DG-affiliation. 
 
For purposes of correspondence, please use my email address: zuzanm04@student.hia.no
 
Should you require references, please contact my supervisor: 
Prof. Jarle Trondal  
Instittut for statsvitenskap og ledelsesfag 
Fakultet for økonomi og samfunnsfag 
Agder University College. 
His e-address: jarle.trondal@hia.no
 
 
With hope of your understanding and co-operation, 
 
Yours truly, 
 
Zuzana Murdoch. 
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/ 1
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/ 5
 
D
ep
ar
tm
en
ta
l r
ol
e 
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/ 1
 
3 
/ 1
 
1 
/ 3
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/ 2
 
2 
/ 2
 
2 
/ 2
 
Su
pr
an
at
io
na
l r
ol
e 
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8 
/ 3
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 / 
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3 
/ 6
 
8 
/ 4
 
5 
/ 6
 
9 
/ 3
 
N
at
io
na
l r
ol
e 
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/ 1
 
3 
/ 4
 
3 
/ 1
 
4 
/ 2
 
2 
/ 3
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 / 
9 
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13
 / 
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11
 / 
10
 
15
 / 
9 
N
ot
e:
  T
he
 n
um
be
r o
f r
ol
es
 is
 h
ig
he
r t
ha
n 
th
e 
nu
m
be
r o
f S
N
Es
 a
s 
so
m
e 
pr
of
es
s 
m
ul
tip
le
 ro
le
s 
(e
ve
n 
th
ou
gh
 s
om
et
im
es
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
is
 m
is
si
ng
 fr
om
 c
er
ta
in
 S
N
Es
 c
on
ce
rn
in
g 
gi
ve
n 
sc
op
e 
co
nd
iti
on
s. 
a  T
he
 fi
rs
t (
se
co
nd
) n
um
be
r e
qu
al
s t
he
 n
um
be
r o
f S
N
Es
 th
at
 fe
lt 
th
e 
do
m
es
tic
 a
nd
 C
om
m
is
si
on
 st
ru
ct
ur
e 
w
er
e 
in
co
m
pa
tib
le
 (c
om
pa
tib
le
).  
b  T
he
 fi
rs
t (
se
co
nd
) n
um
be
r e
qu
al
s t
he
 n
um
be
r o
f S
N
Es
 th
at
 la
ck
ed
 (h
av
e)
 c
on
ta
ct
s w
ith
 th
e 
do
m
es
tic
 in
st
itu
tio
ns
. 
 
c  T
he
 fi
rs
t (
se
co
nd
) n
um
be
r e
qu
al
s t
he
 n
um
be
r o
f S
N
Es
 w
ith
 N
at
io
na
l (
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l) 
ed
uc
at
io
n.
 
 
d  T
he
 fi
rs
t (
se
co
nd
) n
um
be
r e
qu
al
s t
he
 n
um
be
r o
f S
N
Es
 w
ith
 m
or
e 
(le
ss
) t
ha
n 
fo
ur
 y
ea
rs
 p
re
vi
ou
s w
or
k 
ex
pe
rie
nc
e.
 
e  T
he
 fi
rs
t (
se
co
nd
) n
um
be
r e
qu
al
s t
he
 n
um
be
r o
f S
N
Es
 th
at
 la
ck
 (h
av
e)
 in
te
ns
iv
e 
co
nt
ac
t w
ith
 c
ol
le
ag
ue
s i
n 
th
e 
C
om
m
is
si
on
. 
 
f  T
he
 fi
rs
t (
se
co
nd
) n
um
be
r e
qu
al
s t
he
 n
um
be
r o
f S
N
Es
 w
ith
 (w
ith
ou
t) 
pr
ev
io
us
 p
ub
lic
 se
ct
or
 e
xp
er
ie
nc
e.
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 c
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 c
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g 
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n 
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nd
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he
 fi
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t (
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) n
um
be
r e
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s t
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 n
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be
r o
f S
N
Es
 th
at
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th
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do
m
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 C
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m
is
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w
er
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in
co
m
pa
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 (c
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pa
tib
le
).  
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he
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t (
se
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nd
) n
um
be
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s t
he
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r o
f S
N
Es
 th
at
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ck
ed
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 c
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ith
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m
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 in
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al
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r o
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ith
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at
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at
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ed
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 fi
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 m
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fo
ur
 y
ea
rs
 p
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rie
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e.
 
e  T
he
 fi
rs
t (
se
co
nd
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 n
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r o
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N
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at
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ol
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om
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is
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ith
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ev
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